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ABSTRACT
When first introduced, decoupled payments were thought to have minimal
impacts on current production decisions and input use. In order to comply with the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture requiring all World Trade Organization
(WTO) member countries to reduce trade distorting agricultural policies, in 1996 U.S.
agricultural policies began shifting away from coupled payments, based on current prices,
production, or output, towards decoupled payments.
However, the literature has identified several mechanisms by which decoupled
payments have the potential to distort production in the current period. First, risk averse
producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects. Second, in
imperfect credit markets decoupled payments may ease constraints by increasing total
wealth. Third, current production decisions may be influenced by the farmer’s
expectation of future decoupled payment policies, in particular after policy changes in the
2002 and 2008 Farm Bills. Fourth, input markets are affected through possible changes
in the allocation of labor, land, and other inputs. Lastly, exit deterrence may result in
fewer people leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed costs, declining average costs,
or cross-subsidization.
In the theory section, a typical farmer’s expected utility maximization problem
illustrates that coupled payments are shown to affect optimal allocations of acreage
(extensive margin) and production inputs (intensive margin) because they are linked to
current prices, production, or inputs.

In theory, decoupled payments do not affect

optimal allocations of acreage and production inputs because they are not tied to current
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prices, production, or inputs. However, when farmers are allowed to update historical
base acres and yields upon which future decoupled payments are based, uncertainty
creates a coupling mechanism between production decisions and decoupled payments.
Using FCRS and ARMS farm-level data collected by NASS between 1991 and
2008, weighted ordinary least squares regression analysis suggests a positive relationship
between both decoupled payments and other government payments and per acre
expenditures on agricultural chemicals. However, decoupled payments may affect the
intensive margin more than other government payments. Lastly, the 2008 Farm Bill may
implicitly create a coupling mechanism because base yield is calculated using an
Olympic moving average, meaning that each year the historic period changes. The
results suggest that current US agricultural policies are production distorting and thus
may be in violation of standing WTO agreements.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It is with great pleasure that I express appreciation to my wonderful family,
friends, and colleagues that have helped me through this process. This thesis would not
have been possible without their encouragement, guidance, and support. I would like to
extend thanks to my parents for instilling in me a strong drive to achieve my goals and to
my friends for helping me stay positive. My deepest gratitude goes to my husband Chris
for his immeasurable love and ability to empower me on my never-ending quest for
knowledge.
I would also like to thank my committee members, Julia Sharp and Bill Ward for
their constructive comments on the thesis and their patience with a process that always
took longer than expected. I am sincerely indebted to my committee chair Jaclyn Kropp
for her constant support and encouragement. She has been an invaluable advisor, mentor,
travel partner, and friend for the past year and a half. I wish to thank her for always
having time to listen, never tiring of answering questions, offering her expertise, and
believing in my abilities to complete this thesis long before I did.
I would like to thank Robert Dubman at the Economic Research Service for
helping me obtain access to data without which the empirical analysis could not have
been possible. Additionally, I thank Eddie Wells, Howard Hill, Larry Hoyt, and the staff
of the South Carolina National Agricultural Statistics Service field office in Columbia for
taking time out of their busy schedules to examine output before it left the office and their
timely response to addressing computer malfunctions.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TITLE PAGE .................................................................................................................... i
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iv
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ ix
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1

II.

POLICY BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 6
Decoupled Payments and the WTO ......................................................... 8
Decoupled Payments in the US.............................................................. 11
Degrees of Decoupled Payments ........................................................... 17
Agriculture and the Environment........................................................... 18
Summary ................................................................................................ 19

III.

LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 21
Coupling Mechanisms of Decoupled Payments .................................... 22
Input Use and Decoupled Payments ...................................................... 32
Summary ................................................................................................ 35

IV.

THEORY ..................................................................................................... 37
Profit Maximization without Government Payments ............................ 37
Profit Maximization with Price Supports .............................................. 40
Profit Maximization with Decoupled Direct
Payments ........................................................................................ 41
Profit Maximization with Decoupled Direct
Payments and Updating .................................................................. 43
Profit Maximization with All Government
Payments and Updating .................................................................. 47

v

Table of Contents (Continued)
Page
Summary ................................................................................................ 49
V.

METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................... 51
Data ........................................................................................................ 51
Model ..................................................................................................... 58
Regression Equations ............................................................................. 65

VI.

RESULTS .................................................................................................... 69
Summary Statistics................................................................................. 69
Regression Analysis Results: 1991-2008............................................... 75
Regression Analysis Results: Structural Breaks .................................... 84
Summary ................................................................................................ 94

VII.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION ..................................................... 97
Implications.......................................................................................... 100
Limitations and Further Research ........................................................ 102

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. 104
A:
B:
C:
D:

Comparison of Partially and Fully Decoupled Payments .......................... 105
Descriptive Statistics.................................................................................. 106
Marginal Effects of Government Payments, Insurance,
and Solvency ........................................................................................ 108
Estimation of Structural Breaks ................................................................. 110

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 111

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

2.1

Annual U.S. de Minimis Values for Select Crops,
1995-2000 .............................................................................................. 10

2.2

Production Support Estimated: Coupled and Decoupled
Payment Allocations, 1985-2008 ........................................................... 11

5.1

National Commodity Survey Years, 1991-2008 .......................................... 56

5.2

North Central and Heartland Regions Commodity Survey
Years, 1991-2008 ................................................................................... 67

5.3

Variables Used in Weighted OLS Regression Analysis .............................. 61

6.1

Summary Statistics, 1991-2008 ................................................................... 70

6.2

Fertilizers and Other Agricultural Chemicals Weighted
OLS Regression Results ........................................................................ 78

6.3

Fertilizer Weighted OLS Regression Results with
Structural Breaks in 1996 and 2002 ....................................................... 84

6.4

Fertilizer Weighted OLS Regression Results with
Structural Breaks in 1996 and 2004 ....................................................... 87

6.5

Other Agricultural Chemicals Weighted OLS Regression
Results with Structural Breaks in 1996 and 2002 .................................. 89

6.6

Other Agricultural Chemicals Weighted OLS Regression
Results with Structural Breaks in 1996 and 2000 .................................. 93

A.1

Comparison of PFC, DP, CCP, and ACRE Programs
in U.S. Farm Bills ................................................................................ 105

B.1

Average Harvested Acreage of Program Crops
in Extended Heartland Region, 1991-2008 .......................................... 106

vii

List of Tables (Continued)
Table

Page

C.1

Marginal Effects of Decoupled Direct Payments, Other
Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency on
Fertilizer Expenditures Evaluated at the Mean .................................... 108

C.2

Marginal Effects of Decoupled Direct Payments, Other
Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency on
Other Agricultural Chemical Expenditures Evaluated
at the Mean........................................................................................... 109

D.1

Iterative Chow Test Statistics Estimating Structural
Breaks Around Policy Changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008:
Fertilizer Model ................................................................................... 110

D.2

Iterative Chow Test Statistics Estimating Structural
Breaks Around Policy Changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008:
Other Agricultural Chemicals Model................................................... 110

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

B.1

Average Decoupled Payments per Acre in Extended
Heartland Region, 1996-2008 .............................................................. 106

B.2

Value of Production in Extended Heartland Region,
1991-2008 ............................................................................................ 107

B.3

Primary Operator’s Level of Education in Extended
Heartland Region, 1991-2008 .............................................................. 107

ix

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The United States has a long history of supporting farmers, first through
education and research in the late 1800s, then through income maintenance via price
supports during the Great Depression. Price supports continued to be the main form of
government support to farmers until the introduction of decoupled payments in 1996.
The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture required all World Trade
Organization (WTO) member countries to reduce trade distorting agricultural policies
and move toward decoupled support not based on current production, prices, or inputs.
Decoupled direct payments were first introduced to U.S. agricultural policy with the
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act that began implementing
Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments to farm operators based on historic
acreage and yields.
Direct payments were continued in the two subsequent Farm Bills. The Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI) gave farmers the option of updating
their base acreage and yields, essentially allowing farmers to change their historical
acreage and yields upon which decoupled payments were based. The Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008 (FCE) continued decoupled payments but gave farmers the
option of foregoing direct payments to obtain Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE)
program payments that are based on both national market price and state average yields.
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In addition, the 2008 Farm Bill permitted farmers to adjust base acreage once again to
allow for the addition of newly covered commodities.
Until recently, the literature on decoupled payments concluded that, in theory,
decoupled payments do not distort production decisions in the current period since the
marginal production decision is not altered (Alston & Hurd, 1990; Blandford, de Gorter,
& Harvey, 1989; Rucker, Thurman, & Sumner, 1995; Sumner & Wolf, 1996) However,
recent research has offered several mechanisms by which decoupled payments have the
potential to distort production in the current period.
The literature on decoupled payments acknowledges several mechanisms by
which decoupled payments can become “coupled” to production, prices, or inputs. First,
risk averse producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects from
expectations of continued payments in the future (Hennessy, 1998). Second, imperfect
credit markets allow decoupled payments to ease constraints by increasing total wealth
(Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006). Third, current production
decisions may be influenced by expectations of future decoupled payments, in particular
after liberal updating was allowed in the 2002 Farm Bill (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010;
Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008). Fourth, input markets are affected through possible
changes in the allocation of labor and land, due to capitalization of these decoupled
payments in land values (Ahearn, El-Osta, & Dewbre, 2006; Kirwan, 2009). Lastly, exit
deterrence may result in fewer farms leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed costs
(Chau & de Gorter, 2005), declining average costs, or cross-subsidization (de Gorter,
Just, & Kropp, 2008).
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All five coupling mechanisms can lead to production distortions, thus changing
input use on the farm directly or indirectly through changes in acreage allocation
(extensive margin), or farming the same number of acres more intensely to increase
yields (intensive margin). The impact of decoupled payments on fertilizer and other
agricultural chemical use might be greater than the impact on other inputs because of
their dual role as inputs and possible insurance against low yields (Rajsic, Weersink, &
Gandorfer, 2009). Because agricultural chemicals have a negative relationship with
environmental quality, the use of these inputs is also important to study due to their
potential impact on the environment.
Previous studies have focused on the effects of decoupled payments on
agricultural output measured in harvested acres (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006) or aggregate
farm investment (Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004) and find small but significant effects on
output and investment. This thesis focuses on the effects of decoupled payments on the
use of agricultural chemical inputs including pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers.
Construction of a typical farmer’s utility maximization problem illustrates the
difference between the effect of coupled and decoupled payments on production. In
theory, decoupled direct payments do not affect a farmer’s optimal allocation of acreage
or inputs because the payments are based on historic, not current, production. However,
if a farmer expects updating to occur, either through government policy changes or the
implicit design of the policy itself (in the case of the ACRE program introduced in 2008),
he or she may alter current farm production decisions in order to maximize future profits
and expected utility. The theoretical model measures production distortions through
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changes in optimal acreage allocation (extensive margin) and changes in optimal input
allocation (intensive margin) due to the effect of decoupled payments and other
government payments. The empirical model then tests the effects of decoupled payments
and other government payments on fertilizer and agricultural chemical use, thus
measuring possible production distortions through changes to the intensive margin.
The theoretical model is tested empirically using data from Farm Costs and
Returns Surveys (FCRS) and Agricultural Resources and Management Surveys (ARMS)
collected by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) between 1991 and 2008.
Ordinary least squares regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis that there is a
positive and significant relationship between both coupled and decoupled government
payments and the use of agricultural chemicals. Chow tests indicate the presence of
structural breaks around the time policy changes occurred in 1996 and 2002.
The empirical results support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship
between both decoupled direct payments and other government payments and agricultural
chemical expenditures per acre. Furthermore, the marginal effects of decoupled direct
payments are greater than the marginal effects of other government payments. This
provides evidence that decoupled payments might affect the intensive margin more than
other government payments and may therefore lead to greater distortions in production.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter Two provides a background on
agricultural policies in the US, including an explanation of the various forms of
decoupled payments. Chapter Three provides a review of the literature on mechanisms
that may couple these payments to prices, production, or inputs, thus distorting
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production. Chapter Four examines the farmer’s utility maximization problem with and
without coupled and decoupled government payments.

Chapter Five explains the

methodology used in the empirical analysis. Chapter Six presents summary statistics and
the results of the ordinary least squares regression estimations. Lastly, Chapter Seven
concludes and discusses the implications of the results.
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CHAPTER TWO
POLICY BACKGROUND
In 1862, the United States Department of Agriculture was created to help improve
U.S. agriculture, mainly through collecting crop production statistics and dispersing the
best seed varieties (Ulibarri, 1979). That role expanded with the passing of Hatch Act in
1887 creating agricultural experiment stations and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 funding
cooperative extension agencies around the country. In the early 20th century, the
government supported farmers through education, innovation, and some credit and
marketing programs. It was not until the Great Depression that the government saw it fit
to protect farm incomes and commodity prices: the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
established the first income and price supports as well as supply controls. Prices were
supported through deficiency payments paid to farmers depending on the quantity they
produced. Parity pricing was used to maintain the purchasing power of certain farm
commodities relative to 1910-1914 levels, considered the ‘Golden Age’ of agriculture,
with both high farm incomes and prices.
Price supports are used as a tool to redistribute wealth to farmers while providing
consumers with food at low prices and are often used in markets that have more inelastic
demand curves because of lack of product substitution. Under these circumstances, a
price increase of one percent results in a decrease in quantity demanded of less than one
percent because the consumer cannot substitute a similar good. Agricultural commodities
such as cotton, feed grains (e.g., corn, oats, barley, and rye), wheat, and soybeans share
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this characteristic and therefore their production has been heavily subsidized
(Lichtenberg & Zilberman, 1986; Rausser, 1992).
Pegging commodity prices to elevated early 20th century levels through parity
pricing proved problematic because it artificially inflated prices to unsustainable levels
and gave farmers incentives to produce more than consumers demanded, resulting in
burdensome surpluses. Parity pricing may have also lead to capitalization, bidding up the
value of farmland and other farm assets. Farmers were able to maintain the purchasing
power parity policies until 1954, which helped sustain production levels during the Great
Depression.
Throughout the 1930s, program-induced maintenance of high prices reduced
domestic and foreign quantity demanded for U.S. commodities, requiring the government
to purchase the surplus crops in order to continue supporting farmers while maintaining
high prices. During World War II, the US was able to export the surplus crops to Europe,
reducing the stores of grain that were building up. After the war, concern grew about a
possible global recession and the collapse of agricultural prices: the Agricultural Act of
1949 reinstated the Depression-era price and income supports.
The 1954 Farm Bill was amended to remove full parity pricing in exchange for
flexible price supports at less than 100 percent of parity. Flexible price supports that
depended on the quantity of commodity produced continued until the 1970s, when a new
Farm Bill created price supports tied to market price (not historic parity-price) and
production, called coupled direct payments. Nevertheless, decades of rigid price supports
set much higher than market prices resulted in “massive stock accumulation, deficiency
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payments, export subsidies, and land idling” (Sumner, 2007) in periods of low
prices. Short periods of high prices reduced the stockpiles and allowed land to return to
production.
The Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA) addressed stockpiles by lowering price
support levels and reducing supply controls, allowing agricultural commodity prices to
align more with the market. However, almost all payment programs were coupled to
production, commodity price, or input use, thus directly affecting farm-level decision
making as well as distorting foreign and domestic markets. The 1985 FSA also
addressed the growing concern over the negative environmental impacts associated with
agriculture by creating programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program to take
highly eroded and ecologically vulnerable land out of production (Congress,
1985). However, the structure of agricultural support did not change significantly until
the introduction of decoupled direct payments in the 1996 Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) following the signing of the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in 1994.
Decoupled Payments and the WTO
The AoA required all World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries to
reduce trade distorting agricultural policies and move towards decoupled payments not
based on current production, prices, or inputs. To this end, the WTO created three
‘boxes,’ or classifications, of agricultural domestic support and trade policies used to
determine which types of policies would be allowed and which policies would be
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restricted to minimize trade-distortion. The boxes were named amber, blue, and green.
Amber box policies, such as tariffs and market price supports, clearly distort trade and
production. Developed countries with policies that fall within this box committed to
reducing their total aggregate measure of support (AMS) by twenty percent within sixyears; developing countries committed to a 13.3 percent reduction within ten-years
(WTO, 1994).
AMS is the monetary amount of government support given to a sector of the
domestic economy. It includes both government subsidies and consumer transfers that
result from domestic policies that distort market prices. Current AMS is calculated per
commodity and is measured by finding the difference between the world market price
with historic base years 1986-1988 and the ‘administered price’ or sum of all amber box
support explicitly or implicitly linked to the production of that commodity and
multiplying that by the total quantity receiving the administered price (WTO, 1994). If
this product is greater than the de minimis amount allowed for that commodity, it is
counted in the total AMS. The de minimis clause of the AoA stipulates that there is no
commitment to reducing amber box subsidies “in any year in which the aggregate value
of the product-specific support does not exceed 5 per cent of the total value of production
of the agricultural product in question” (WTO, 1994). Thus, de minimis support is not
included in AMS calculations. However, five percent can account for a great deal: in
2000, any amber box support for corn with a total AMS less than $917 million was
exempt under the de minimis clause (OECD, 2008b). Table 2.1 shows the U.S. de
minimis values for major crops within the commitment time period. Because total AMS
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is measured without reference to a specific commodity, it is possible to reduce AMS by
reducing the subsidy of one commodity while increasing the subsidy of another
commodity.
Table 2.1. Annual U.S. de Minimis Values for Select Crops, 1995-2000
Commodity
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Barley
$51,930
$53,763
$42,825
$34,860
$29,820
Cotton
$328,633
$320,492
$298,577
$206,096 $190,581
Maize
$1,198,808 $1,251,011 $1,118,630 $946,623 $858,221
Sorghum
$73,154
$93,047
$70,007
$43,154
$46,708
Soybeans
$730,549
$800,048
$869,811 $675,6560 $614,401
Wheat
$496,566
$489,638
$419,368
$337,520 $285,076

2000
$33,549
$212,855
$917,138
$44,510
$626,066
$291,868

Notes: *In U.S. Millions; (OECD, 2008b)

Policies that fall within the two remaining boxes, green and blue, do not require
any reduction commitments. Green box subsidies must not significantly distort trade and
are funded publically, not by transfers from consumers. These include decoupled direct
payments, environmental protection policies, and rural development subsidies. Blue box
policies are referred to as the “amber box with conditions” (WTO, 2002) because they
include supports that are linked to production like amber box policies, but are subject to
production limits so they are deemed minimally trade-distortive and fully allowed within
the WTO. Blue box policies include infra-marginal support policies.
Because there is only a limit on amber box subsidies and each country determines
which box their policies fall into, there is an incentive to move policies to the green and
blue boxes without actually minimizing the trade-distorting effects of the policies (Baffes
& de Gorter, 2005). Critics of the WTO’s classification of agricultural policies suggest
that the system puts developing countries at a disadvantage and does not actually
liberalize trade (Adams et al., 2001; Chand & Phillip, 2001; Monge-Arino,
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2007). Although the system may not be as effective as presumed, it does favor the
implementation of decoupled payments, as they will always fall into either the green or
the blue box.
Decoupled Payments in the US
As shown in Table 2.2, between 1986 and 1995, on average 95 percent of the total
value of transfers from consumers and taxpayers to farmers (Producer Support Estimate
or PSE 1) was comprised of various coupled payments based on output (e.g. market price
supports), inputs (e.g. irrigation support), or current farm characteristics such as total land
area, revenue, and income (e.g. deficiency payments). Decoupled payments made up less
than five percent of the PSE on average, the majority of which was spent on the new
Conservation Reserve Program.
Table 2.2. Production Support Estimates: Coupled and Decoupled Payment
Allocations, 1986-2008
FSA Act: FAIR Act: FSRI Act:
1986-1995 1996-2001 2002-2008
Total Producer Support Estimate*
$324,179
$264,436
$248,648
Coupled Payments:
95.29%
76.29%
70.51%
Based on output
47.40%
52.04%
32.09%
Based on inputs
22.33%
16.76%
25.90%
Based on current farm characteristics
25.56%
7.49%
12.52%
Decoupled Payments:
4.71%
23.71%
29.49%
Based on historic farm characteristics,
0.27%
19.00%
22.58%
production not required
Based on non-commodity criteria
4.43%
4.71%
6.91%
Notes: *In U.S. Millions; (OECD, 2008b)

1

Producer Support Estimate is “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and
taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that
support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income”
(OECD, 2008a)
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Table 2.2 illustrates the switch from coupled deficiency payments to decoupled
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC) introduced in 1996. With the passing of the FAIR
Act, decoupled payments given directly to farmers based on historical yields and acres
planted became the standard form of income support for many commodity programs in
the US. Decoupled direct payments were continued in the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI), giving farmers the option to update their base acreage
and yields. Moreover, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (FCE) continued
decoupled direct payments but gave farmers the option of foregoing a portion of their
direct payments to obtain Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program payments
providing participants with a revenue flow that is based on both national market price and
state average yields. In addition, FCE permitted farmers to adjust base acreage once
again to allow for the addition of newly covered commodities. A summary of the
primary decoupled direct payments used in U.S. programs follows.
Production Flexibility Contracts (1996 -2002) and
Fixed Direct Payments (2002 -2012)
The 1996 FAIR Act eliminated many supply controls on field crops and introduced
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC). Farms producing wheat, feed grains (corn,
barley, sorghum, and oats), rice, and upland cotton were allowed a one-time enrollment
for a seven-year contract where eligibility was dependent on participation in a production
adjustment program between 1991 and 1995. 2 Payments were determined by the product
of the specific payment rate αi for each crop i, historic base yield Ψ Hi for each crop i, and
2

The production adjustment program was from the 1990 Farm Bill.
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85 percent of base acres in historic planting period H for crop i, AiH (E. Young &
Shields, 1996): 3
PFC Paymenti = 0.85α i Ψ i AiH .
Producers were free to plant any amount of the base acres with any crop (with
limitations on fruits, vegetables and specialty crops), allowing for more flexibility in the
mix of commodities planted as well as the total acreage planted. For example, a farm
could receive a payment based on historic corn acreage but plant wheat and oats in the
fields.
In the 2002 FSRI Act, PFC were replaced with fixed direct payments (FDP) that
worked much the same way. Eligibility for FDP changed from a seven-year contract to
an annual agreement. Effective in 2009, the FSRI Act changed the calculation of
payment acres from 85 percent of base acres in a selected commodity to 83.3
percent. Fixed direct payments also expanded the types of crops supported to include
soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts 4 (ERS, 2002; Young & Shields, 1996), creating the
possibility for farmers to update base acreage and yield.
Counter-Cyclical Payments (2002-2012)
The 2002 FSRI Act introduced counter-cyclical payments (CCP) as another form
of income support, replacing the Market Loss Assistance (MLA) Program 5 introduced in
1998 as a supplement to the FAIR Act. A decline in commodity prices and projected
3

See Appendix A for full explanation of what Payment Acres and Payment Yields cover in each Farm Bill.
Special provisions are made concerning peanuts.
5
Classification of MLA payments is disputed: Burfisher and Hopkins (2004) suggest MLA’s are tied to
market price and therefore fully coupled and would be classified within the Amber Box, while Adams et al.
(2001) analyze MLA payments side-by-side PFC payments as fully decoupled.
4
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farm income in 1998 paired with reduced global demand for agricultural products due to
the Asian economic crisis led to Congress creating an emergency assistance package of
close to $3 billion to be paid directly to farmers (ERS, 2002). Like PFC and fixed direct
payments, CCP are based on historic, not current, production. However, CCP are only
instituted when the effective price is less than the target price set in the FSRI Act and
therefore are only “partially” decoupled as CCP are still linked to current prices (ERS,
2008).
Another difference between FSRI Act policies and previous policies is in the
calculation of base acreage and yield. The FSRI Act allowed farmers three options to
calculate base yield and acreage used in the CCP and FDP payout rate (ERS, 2002).
First, they could keep calculating base yield the same way as before. Second, a farmer
could update base yields used in the CCP payout calculation to the sum of program yields
(set by FSRI Act) and 70 percent of the difference between current program yields and
the farm’s average yield from 1998 to 2001:

(

)

Ψ H 1 = Ψ FSRI + 0.70 Ψ t − Ψ F 98 − 01 .
Third, farmers had the option to update base yield to 93.5 percent of the average national
yields between 1998 and 2001:
Ψ H 2 = 0.935Ψ N 98 − 01 .

Two additional ways to determine base acreage were also introduced through the
CCP. First, base acreage could be calculated as the sum of the total base acreage that
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would have been used to calculate 2002 PFC payments plus average oilseed plantings
between 1998 and 2001: 6
AH 1 = A98 − 01 + Α98 − 01oil .

Additionally, farmers could choose to update base acreage to include a four-year average
of total acres planted and acres unable to be planted due to weather conditions between
1998 and 2001 (ERS, 2002):
AH 2 = A98 − 01 + Α98 − 01idle .

Average Crop Revenue Election (2008-2012)
The newest decoupled policy was introduced in the 2008 FCE Act. Average Crop
Revenue Election (ACRE) payments provide participants with a guaranteed revenue flow
that is based on both national market price and state average yields. Producers enrolled
in ACRE must remain enrolled until 2012 and are not eligible for CCP. Enrollment in
ACRE also reduces all fixed direct payments to the farm by 20 percent. The program
covers an even greater number of commodities: wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats,
upland cotton, rice, soybeans, other oilseeds, peanuts, dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas,
and large chickpeas.
ACRE payments are contingent on national average market prices and planted
yields within the state. Farmers are given direct payments totaling 90 percent of the
product of the five-year benchmark state yield and the two-year ACRE program
guarantee price. ACRE benchmark state yield is a commodity and state specific measure
6

This option applies unless base acres exceed available cropland. Each producer must select one of the
two options to apply to all covered commodities for both direct and counter-cyclical payments.
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of the fitted average yield per planted acre; the ACRE program guarantee price is a
national commodity specific two-year average market price (ERS, 2008). If ACRE
revenue for the state and farm is less than the program guarantee and the benchmark
farm, participants receive a payment (ERS, 2008). The ACRE program differs from
previous support programs because the payments are based on moving averages of yields
and prices, not a set historical time period as is seen with PFCs and FDPs. Because
producers base their decision to participate in ACRE on the historic and expected
variability in prices, the program works as a partially decoupled policy similar to CCP.
Both ACRE and CCP are viewed as insurance programs linked to price.
Decoupled Direct Payments and Updating
With each new Farm Bill, changes in the way payment acres and payment yields
are calculated permitted farmers to update their base acres and yields upon which
payments are based. For example, the 2002 Farm Bill added soybeans, other oilseeds and
peanuts to the list of program crops. Farmers that grew acreage of those crops were able
to increase their payment, and base acres to include any soybeans, oilseeds, or peanuts
planted during the base period. Further updating was permitted in 2008 when pulse crops
were added to program crops. Updating can also occur with changes in how yield and
acreage are calculated.

As discussed above, countercyclical payments have three

alternative calculations of base yields and two calculations of base acreage. If a farmer
comes to expect updating or policy changes every seven to ten years, he or she may
change his or her current production now to increase the payout in the future. More
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detail about how updating enables decoupled payments to distort production will be
provided in subsequent chapters (Chapter 3 and 4).
Degrees of Decoupled Payments
Generally, decoupled payments can be defined as any measure of support that
does not affect production decisions such that production at the farm level remains
unchanged with or without the decoupled payment. Coupled payments can then be
defined as any measure of support that affects production decisions such that production
at the farm level changes with the presence of the coupled payment. Support programs,
such as counter-cyclical payments and ACRE, that are linked to current commodity
prices but not current production are identified as ‘partially’ decoupled because they are
less distortive than programs linked to both price and production. Support programs,
such as fixed direct payments and production flexibility contracts, that are not linked to
current prices or production are identified as ‘fully’ decoupled payments because, in
theory, they do not distort production. 7
The USDA defines decoupled direct payments as “lump-sum income transfers to
farm operators that do not depend on current production, factor use, or commodity prices
and for which eligibility is based on fixed, historical criteria” (Burfisher & Hopkins,
2004). Hennessey (1998) uses a more relaxed definition of the term decoupled in his
research, allowing any lump-sum payment made independent of production to count as
fully decoupled, including crop disaster payments and one-time crop insurance
7

The semantics behind the name may be interesting for readers, however the literature reviewed in the
following chapter suggests that even ‘fully’ decoupled payments are not completely decoupled.
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payments. Other authors suggest that timing and expectations play an important role in
whether or not a payment is decoupled. Goodwin and Mishra (2006) argue that in order
for a payment to be fully decoupled, it must only be a fixed and guaranteed lump-sum
transfer to farms for a historic time period. In this framework, the 2002 FSRI Act and the
2008 FCE Act created payments that were only partially decoupled from production
decisions because allowing farmers to update base acres and yields can ultimately change
production decisions based on past experience and future expectations. In the context of
this thesis, decoupled payments will be defined following Goodwin and Mishra’s more
strict definition.
Agriculture and the Environment
In the 1960s, public concern over the use of pesticides in agricultural practices
and agricultural policies began to be examined within an environmental framework
(Dixon, Dixon, & Miranowski, 1973; Rausser, 1992). Although soil conservation is an
environmental concern, it does not have the same widespread social concern as the use of
carcinogenic pesticides. During the 1960s, it became apparent that agricultural policies
have implications not just for the producers and consumers of crops, but on the
environment as well (Rausser, 1992). The use of pesticides in agriculture remains a
heated debate and many studies show that coupled price supports increase the amount of
pesticides used for each commodity (Cowan & Gunby, 1996; Dixon, Dixon, &
Miranowski, 1973; Johnson, Wolcott, & Aradhyula, 1990; Lichtenberg & Zilberman,
1986; Rausser, 1992). To compound this, only 15 percent of farms participating in
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commodity programs (including all forms of decoupled direct payments) are also
participating in conservation programs and almost half of all farms receiving commodity
program payments do not receive any conservation payment (Claassen & Morehart,
2006).

The recent movement towards decoupling farm support should reduce the

motivation to overproduce, thus creating the positive yet unintended effect of decreasing
the usage of fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals unless coupling occurs through
the mechanisms discussed in detail in the next two chapters.
Although income transfers via decoupled direct payments should not, in theory,
affect marginal production decisions since farmers receive the market price for the last
unit they produce, such a transfer may alter the decision to enter or exit the market or
may influence an individual farmer’s risk preferences or alter access to credit or change a
farmer’s expectations about future government agricultural support policies resulting in
changes to farm household consumption and investment decisions (de Gorter, Just &
Kropp, 2008; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; Hennessy, 1998; C. E. Young & Westcott,
2000). Thus decoupled direct payments can ultimately lead to a change in aggregate
production and/or a change in the types and quantities of inputs used in production,
with possible environmental consequences (Adams et al., 2001; Orazem & Miranowski,
1994; Wu, 1999).
Summary
The United States has a long history of supporting farmers, first through
education and research, then beginning in the Great Depression with income supports via
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coupled price supports, a practice that was continued in various forms until the
introduction of decoupled payments in the 1996 FAIR Act. Decoupled payments were
introduced in the hopes of supporting farmer’s income directly, without creating
production distortions. Recent literature suggests that while in theory decoupled direct
payments should not distort production, there are several mechanisms by which this
occurs. Chapter Three will address these mechanisms directly with a review of the
literature.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW
Decoupled and partially decoupled support programs are far from the transparent
policies suggested by the WTO’s classification scheme of amber, green and blue
boxes. Decoupled

income

transfers

such

as

production

flexibility

contracts,

countercyclical payments, and fixed direct payments were thought to not affect marginal
production decisions because producers receive the market price for their last unit of
production. However, such a transfer may influence a farmer’s production decision via
the coupling mechanisms discussed in this chapter. These coupling mechanisms are
likely to have an effect on farm household consumption and investment decisions, thus
resulting in a change in aggregate production and/or a change in the types and quantities
of inputs used in production, including fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals.
The literature on decoupled payments acknowledges several mechanisms by
which decoupled payments can become ‘coupled’ to production, prices, or inputs. First,
risk averse producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects from
expectations of continued payments in the future (Hennessy, 1998). Second, in imperfect
credit markets decoupled payments may ease constraints by increasing total wealth
(Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006). Third, current production
decisions may be influenced by expectations of future decoupled payments, in particular
after liberal updating was allowed in the 2002 Farm Bill (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010;
Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008). Fourth, input markets are affected through possible
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changes in the allocation of labor and land, due to capitalization of decoupled payments
in land values (Ahearn, El-Osta, & Dewbre, 2006; Kirwan, 2009). Lastly, exit deterrence
may result in fewer people leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed costs (Chau & de
Gorter, 2005), declining average costs, or cross-subsidization (de Gorter, Just, & Kropp,
2008).
This literature review begins with a summary of these studies and then focuses
further on studies examining the effect of decoupled payments on input use, specifically,
fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals. These inputs are particularly important to
understand because of their dual role as production inputs and possible insurance against
low yields (Rajsic, Weersink, & Gandorfer, 2009; Roosen & Hennessy, 2003).
Furthermore, if decoupled payments do distort production through increases in
agricultural chemicals, there is potential for unintended environmental damage.
Coupling Mechanisms of Decoupled Payments
1. Insurance and Wealth Effects
Increases in income via decoupled payments may change a farmer’s risk tolerance
by reducing uncertainty associated with fluctuating commodity prices (Hennessy, 1998;
Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 1993; Sandmo, 1971). Hennessy (1998) analyzes the insurance
and wealth effects of decoupled and coupled payments to risk-averse farmers. Through a
mathematical framework, Hennessy first proposes three ways that both decoupled and
coupled payments can be linked to a profit maximizing farmer’s optimal production
decisions. If wealth and/or insurance effects are present, a decoupled payment received
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by a farmer under decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) will lead to an increase in a
choice variable if 1) the payment increases with the level of uncertainty 2) the risk averse
producer decreases production under greater uncertainty, and 3) the payment increases at
a decreasing rate with the level of uncertainty (this is the second order condition for the
first premise).
Hennessy then examines insurance effects alone for a farmer under constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and finds similar results, signifying that a decoupled
payment can act as an income stabilizer if a payment increases at a decreasing rate with
the level of uncertainty. Conversely, a decoupled payment can create more income
volatility if both the decoupled payment and the marginal increase in the payment
increases with an increase in the level of uncertainty.
In order to compare decoupled and coupled payments, Hennessy lastly proposes
that under coupled payment plans, producers face a profit function that includes the
expected coupled payment, creating a much larger and direct effect on production
decisions. In all three propositions, the payment creates an incentive for a risk averse
producer to increase production when uncertainty increases by mitigating a part of
uncertainty.
To understand the magnitude of these three propositions, Hennessy simulates
various coupled and decoupled payment options for a 400-acre corn farm in Iowa to
determine how nitrogen levels (the selected choice variable) and yield (a measure of
production) change with risk. As expected, he finds that coupled payments lead to
greater increases in yield and nitrogen use than do decoupled payments, with risk neutral
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farmers increasing nitrogen use the most and farmers under DARA increasing their
nitrogen use least. Furthermore, although decoupled payments are less distortive than
traditional coupled payments, they still increase input use and yield, signaling that these
payments influence production decisions.
Hennessy concludes that the insurance effects of program payments are found to
have the largest impact on production, followed by coupling impacts and lastly wealth
effects. Under high CARA (with no wealth effect possible), adding a production
flexibility contract (PFC)-style payment with a target price of $2.75 and yield of 120
bushels per acre is shown to increase nitrogen use by 12 percent and yield by 2 to 3
percent. While controlling for insurance effects by creating an equivalent lump-sum
payout of $27,943, adding the same payment under DARA only increases nitrogen use by
1 percent. The large insurance effect of decoupled payments may be exacerbated because
many government programs are designed for markets with higher levels of risk (and
therefore high insurance effects). 8
Changes in production associated with decoupled payments have generally been
positive and small, but statistically significant (Adams et al., 2001; Coble, Miller, &
Hudson, 2008; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; Plantinga, 1996). Adams et al. (2001) used
ordinary least squares regression analysis to determine whether PFC and market loss
assistance (MLA) payments increased land use (measured in total crop area) in eleven
Midwestern states between 1997 and 2000. The authors find that PFC and MLA
payments do not have a significant relationship to land use. They also find that if the
8

In fact, almost all government programs for agriculture require some form of crop insurance or a
guarantee to not accept disaster support such as Market Loan Assistance.
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payments increased by 10 percent, crop area planted would increase roughly by 0.3
percent. Contrary to previous studies, the researchers also find that when PFC and MLA
payments are combined with other marketing loans, they have a statistically significant
effect on total crop area, even though marketing loans themselves do not significantly
impact crop area. This contradiction may be due to the higher insurance effect found in
MLA payments because they are linked to current prices. The Adams et al. study may
not fully capture farmers’ responses to changes in marketing loans and government
payments due to the short time period analyzed (only four years). Also, the study does
not account for changes in crop mix, which would also have an effect on land use.
2. Imperfect Credit Markets
Administering decoupled payments in imperfect credit markets can create a
coupling mechanism by increasing the farmer’s total wealth and indirectly reducing
constraints on credit. Burfisher and Hopkins (2004) analyze the possible effects of
decoupled payments using a computable general equilibrium model and find that given
perfect markets (with access to credit, risk neutrality and no insurance effect), there
would be no increase of aggregate farm investment or production. However, if the credit
market is not perfect, farm investment would only increase 0.2 percent and production
would increase by even less. Burfisher and Hopkins suggest that moving away from all
coupled payments would help the US achieve more market-oriented policies.
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Goodwin and Mishra (2006) also look at credit constraints in a study of
commercial farms in the Corn Belt 9 region. Farm level data from the USDA’s
Agricultural Resources and Management Survey (ARMS) allow the authors to create a
more complete analysis than prior studies, although only four years were used (19982001). The authors estimate acreage equations for the three most abundant crops in the
region, corn, soybean, and wheat, allowing them to examine changes not only in land use
but overall crop mix as well. Variables used include crop price, farm size, government
payments per acre (PFC and MLA payments), input prices (fertilizer, gasoline, and
wages), wealth, a debt to asset ratio to capture credit constraints, and an insurance
expenditure to total expenditure ratio as a measure of a farmer’s level of risk
aversion. The farm-level acreage equations also include interaction variables that capture
the indirect relationship between both PFC payments and risk and PFC payments and
credit constraints.
Goodwin and Mishra find the direct effect of PFC payments on corn and soybean
acreage decisions to be statistically significant and small, with an additional $1.00 in
payments increasing corn acreage by 0.92 acres and soybeans by 0.61 acres per
farm. The interaction terms are both statistically insignificant, indicating that PFC
payments between 1998 and 2001 did not impact acreage decisions indirectly through
credit constraints and risk preferences. The authors note that their study did not find the
“exact mechanism by which” PFC payments affect corn, soybean, and wheat acreage in

9

The Corn Belt covers the USDA’s “Heartland” resource region, a homogenous group of counties in
including most counties Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South
Dakota (Heimlich, 2000).
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the Corn Belt as their analysis does not examine the possibility of intensive changes in
production

practice,

such

as

reducing

or

increasing

fertilizer

or

chemical

applications. Furthermore, the study is limited to cross-sectional data that does not allow
for comparisons of acreage decisions through time.
3. Future Expectations of Updating
As explained in Chapter Two, the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills allow opportunities
for farmers to update base acres and yields. Farmers anticipating the possibility of
updating might have taken advantage of updating by planting additional acreage of crops
they would have otherwise not grown, to ensure that the historic base acres on which
decoupled payments are based was as high as possible. Farmer’s could also increase base
yield by increasing the use of inputs like fertilizer. A study by Coble, Miller and Hudson
(2008) suggests that farmers face large uncertainty about future direct and countercyclical payments: in a 2005 survey conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics
Survey (NASS), about 40 percent of respondents from Iowa and Mississippi expected
base acreage and yield updating would be allowed in the next farm bill. Furthermore, 10
percent of farmers responded that they had previously increased acreage and/or inputs to
‘build base’ in anticipation of the 2002 Farm Bill.
Bhaskar and Bhegin’s (2007) analysis of updating under uncertainty tries to
quantify the extent that future expectations change risk averse farmer’s behavior. They
consider two possible base acreage options provided by the 2002 Farm Bill: 1) new base
acreage must be a four-year average of total acres planted in 1998 to 2001 and 2) no base
acreage updating. Base yields were calculated to be 93.5 percent of 1998 to 2001
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average national yields. 10 The authors then use a model where farmer’s maximize utility
through current and future utility due to the connection created by expected future
updating. As this study is more recent than the ones described above, it uses current
government payments: fixed direct payments (FDP) and counter cyclical payments
(CCP). Recall that both FDP and CCP are based on historic acreage and yield, however,
CCP are brought about by low program crop prices (Chapter Two).
The farmer’s profit function is dependent on the per-period price of crops grown,
total acreage and base acreage, yields, loan rate, government payments, and total
costs. Interestingly, the application of nitrogen as fertilizer appears in two parts of the
model. First, yield is a function of both nitrogen and time; second, total cost is a function
of current acreage and nitrogen application. Thus profit depends directly on price,
acreage, and nitrogen. Since the farmer’s expected utility depends on possible updating,
a term is added to capture the possibility of future program income with no updating and
with updating allowed for in the 2008 Farm Bill (2007-2011):

γ VB + (1 − γ )VNB .
VB is the value of the payment to the farmer if updating is allowed and VNB is the value
of the payment to the farmer if no updating is allowed in the 2008 Farm Bill. The model
also includes a subjective probability of updating (γ) between 0 and 1: if the farmer
thinks there is a 100 percent chance that updating will occur, his subjective probability is
1; if the farmer thinks there is a zero percent chance that updating will occur, γ will be

10

See Appendix A for other updating options available in the 2002 Farm Bill.
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zero. The larger γ, the greater the link between current (2003-2006) acreage and input
decisions and future program crop payments.
Bhaskar and Bhegin use a stochastic dynamic programming approach to solve the
two utility maximization problems (one with updating and one without) using present
value estimation to derive optimal nitrogen and acreage decisions under varying degrees
of certainty in updating. Optimal nitrogen application data from 1979-2003 is obtained
from an experimental farm in Iowa that applies four different amounts of nitrogen to
fields: 0, 80, 160 and 240 pounds per acre. The optimal nitrogen application data is used
to estimate the parameters of optimal acreage for 16 states. The authors find that both
average yield and average acreage increased as farmers become more certain about future
updating (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010).
When farmers were certain that updating is allowed, average acreage increases by
4.74 percent, compared to 3.04 percent for a 50 percent certainty that future updating will
be allowed. Changes in yield were positive but much smaller, with a 0.05 percent change
for 100 percent certainty of updating. Bhaskar and Bhegin suggest that this is because
increasing nitrogen application (which is how they capture yield) has decreasing marginal
returns so increasing yield is expensive. Combining these results, the average increase in
output across all 16 states is 4.8 percent with full certainty of updating.
The study shows that allowing updating has a positive effect on acreage decisions
and a smaller but positive effect on nitrogen use, especially if farmers are given enough
time to change production decisions before the updating goes into effect. However,
Bhaskar and Bhegin’s model may have some over-generalizations. First, the research
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includes farms with only one crop, not allowing farmers to change crop mix instead of
acreage allocation. Also, fertilizer use is likely to be different across crops and across
states, so using nitrogen application as a strict gauge of changes in yield may lead to
under- or over- estimates.
4. Input Markets
Other production decisions can be affected by decoupled payments as well,
including labor and land allocations. Farmers have three ways to allocate their own
labor: working on the farm, working off the farm, or leisure. As payments to farms
increase, hours spent working off the farm are exchanged for farm work (El-Osta,
Mishra, & Ahearn, 2004). This is true for both coupled and decoupled payments,
including the 1996 FSRI’s PFC payments (El-Osta, Mishra, & Ahearn, 2004).
Allocations of land can also be impacted by government payments. Because the
supply of land is inelastic and supply of inputs is assumed to be perfectly elastic at the
individual farm level, landowners are presumed to capture some of the benefits of
government payments in the value of the land, a process called capitalization. Therefore,
farmers renting land would not see government payments as an increase in wealth
because they would not completely capture those payments (Kirwan, 2009). Government
payments would create an incentive for landowners to keep land in agricultural use rather
than forfeit this stream of income. However, 100 percent capitalization is unlikely.
Kirwan (2009) suggests that due to lack of competition in the market for farmland as well
as consolidation within the agriculture sector, 25 percent of government payments pass to
the landlord; roughly 75 percent remains with the tenant. Other research has shown that
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the share of each dollar of direct payments received by farm operators that is passed
through to the landlord in the form of higher rental rates can be as high as 94 percent
(Lence & Mishra, 2003; Rosine & Helmberger, 1974). It is important to keep in mind
that although all government payments are made to the farm operator, they may not be
completely retained by him or her; the larger the proportion of decoupled payments
retained by the farm operator, the greater the impact of the five coupling mechanisms
described in this section (Abler & Blandford, 2005).
5. Exit Deterrence
The final coupling mechanism discussed focuses on the impact of government
payments on the producer’s decision to leave the farming industry. Farmers may use
decoupled payments to cover costs for which they would otherwise be unable to pay for,
thus creating a disincentive to leave the market (Chau & de Gorter, 2005; de Gorter, Just,
Kropp, 2008).
Chau and de Gorter (2005) study the impact of loan deficiency payments and
PFCs on U.S. wheat production, finding that when either government payment covers
fixed costs, low profit firms are able to stay in the market longer than they would have
without the payments, increasing total aggregate production. The impact to aggregate
production is relatively small due to the fact that most marginal farms are not producing
that much wheat, so their output is a rather small percent of the total.
In a study on cross-subsidization, de Gorter, Just and Kropp (2008) examine the
U.S. dairy industry’s reaction to the 2002 FSRI’s Milk Income Loss Contract Program
(MILC). This program pays a countercyclical payment to dairy farmers when the price
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of milk falls below a specified target price. However, only the first 2.4 million pounds of
milk per farm per year is eligible to receive the payment (de Gorter, Just, & Kropp
2008). The authors find that both theoretically and empirically infra-marginal payments
such as the MILC program can increase output as much or more than the equivalent
coupled subsidy in both the short run and the long run due to exit deterrence and crosssubsidization.
Input Use and Decoupled Payments
The empirical and theoretical models discussed above find that decoupled
payments have minor effects on total output but greater effects on input use and crop
mix. Decoupled payments have also been found to change input decisions with possible
environmental consequences (Adams et al., 2001; Orazem & Miranowski, 1994; Wu,
1999). Agricultural inputs such as pesticides, fertilizers, and herbicides can lead to
environmental pollution. Since not all commodities require equal amounts of inputs, any
agricultural policy’s effect on crop mix should be analyzed if minimizing environmental
damage is important. 11 For example, production of corn and soybeans is known to use
more pesticides and fertilizers than wheat. Therefore, any shift towards corn or soybean
production in favor of wheat will increase total agricultural chemical use on the farm.
Due to a lack of panel data, few studies have been conducted examining the
change in crop mix due to agricultural policy. Considering the insurance effect created
by decoupled payments (Hennessy 1998), a risk averse farmer receiving decoupled

11

Since the US has many conservation policies, it is assumed that environmental quality is valued.
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payments will begin planting riskier but more profitable crops. This phenomenon, called
moral hazard, can change the farm’s cropping patterns and crop mix. For example,
“farmers who purchase crop insurance will shift land from hay and pasture to corn” (Wu,
1999), leading to negative impacts on environmental quality as corn requires more
fertilizer and pesticides than hay (Claassen & Morehart, 2006; Horowitz & Lichtenberg,
1993; Monge-Arino, 2007; Plantinga, 1996; Serra et al., 2005; Wu, 1999).
Plantinga (1996) examines a case of moral hazard in dairy production, focusing
on possible gains in environmental quality from reducing milk price supports in
southwestern Wisconsin. This study steers away from field commodities such as corn
and wheat to focus on the equally important dairy sector. The author finds that reducing
price supports would decrease land allocated to dairy production and increase total
forested acres. Plantinga estimates environmental quality by measuring water quality and
soil erosion in the study area and finds that lower support-prices are associated with a
reduction in the use of marginal land. Since erosion is more common on marginal lowquality land, Plantinga’s study finds that environmental quality can increase as farmers
are given an incentive to decrease milk production and increase forestry production.
A welfare analysis suggests that if the ratio of timber-to-milk prices increased 10
percent (effectively a $1.18 in average milk price), consumer surplus would increase by
$8.2 to $13.3 million. While Plantinga’s study is thorough, it does not consider the
different possibilities of risk averse producers, so his results must be considered in a
limited framework. Furthermore, he analyzes a reduction in total price supports, not a
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change from coupled to decoupled payments seen in current policy (Leathers & Quiggin,
1991).
Fertilizer and Other Agricultural Chemicals:
Risk Reducing or Risk Increasing Inputs?
The majority of studies on the effect of decoupled payments on the use of
agricultural chemicals do not focus on the environmental implications of their findings.
Instead, the use of agricultural chemical inputs is looked at in the context of a farmer’s
level of risk aversion

(Hennessy, 1998; Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 1993; Rajsic,

Weersink, & Gandorfer, 2009; Ramaswami, 1992; Roosen & Hennessy, 2003).
There is much debate on whether fertilizers and agricultural chemicals such as
pesticides are risk reducing or risk increasing inputs from the farmer’s standpoint. A
farmer will increase consumption of inputs they view as risk reducing if they are risk
averse: for example, a farmer may add more than the recommended amount of nitrogen if
he thinks it will minimize the level of risk incurred at harvest. 12 On the other hand, if a
risk averse farmer views fertilizer as risk increasing, he may under-apply fertilizer to
reduce risk. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) explain
An input reduces risk if it adds more to output in bad states of nature than
in good states of nature, since this makes output (and profit) in each state of
nature more uniform and decreases yield variability. An input increases
risk if it adds relatively more to output in good states than in bad ones,
since that increases the discrepancy among states. In regions and/or crops
where high pest infestations occur primarily when crop growth conditions
are good, pesticides work by increasing output in good states of nature and
are thus likely to be risk increasing.

12

Rajsic, Weersink, and Gandorfer (2009) suggest that farmers may view fertilizer as “cheap insurance.”
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It is important to remember two things: first, whether or not an input is actually
risk reducing or increasing is less important than the farmer’s level of risk aversion
because this will determine whether he or she applies less than or more than the
recommended amount. If a risk loving farmer believes that fertilizer is a risk reducing
input, he will apply less fertilizer per acre than his risk averse neighbor. Second, because
of all agricultural chemicals’ dual roles as production inputs and possible risk mitigators
(or risk enhancer), it is important to understand how they interact with government
payments, particularly those requiring some level of crop insurance for eligibility.
Summary
Decoupled direct payments have been shown to distort production relative to no
policy being in place through at least five “coupling” mechanisms: insurance and wealth
effects, credit constraints, expectations of policy updating, changes in the allocation of
labor and land, and exit deterrence. Furthermore, production distortions can change input
use on the farm directly or indirectly through changes in crop mix or acreage allocation.
If production distortions lead to increases in the use of other agricultural chemicals, the
rural environment may be negatively affected by unintended negative externalities.
Additionally, the impact on the use of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals may be even
more significant because of their dual role as inputs and possible insurance against low
yields.
The next chapter will discuss in depth the farmer’s expected utility maximization
problem, focusing on how inputs and acreage allocation may change with coupled and
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decoupled government payments, as well as how expectations about updating can affect
the utility maximization decisions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THEORY
The previous chapter illustrates the complex nature of the on-farm decisionmaking process farmers go through. This chapter will show that both input decisions
(intensive margin) and acreage allocation (extensive margin) can change with a change in
decoupled payments by comparing four potential expected utility maximization models:
1) a model without any government payments, 2) a model with only fully coupled price
supports, 3) a model with decoupled payments and no updating, and lastly 4) a model
with decoupled payments and updating possible. To more closely represent the realworld scenario, the final model combines fully coupled price supports, decoupled
payments, and updating.
Profit Maximization without Government Payments
First, it is assumed that all farmers maximize their expected utility of wealth,
including farm profits and off-farm income. Furthermore, farmers will allocate both
acreage and other inputs in order to maximize profit. Equation (4.1) illustrates the
expected utility maximization problem of a typical farmer where both acreage A and
quantity of inputs X are choice variables. Let E be the expectation operator over the
random variables, output prices and yields, and U (⋅) be a concave continuously
differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function suggesting farmers are risk
averse.
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The function gt (⋅) is the sum of the profit function π tnogov (⋅), income from off-farm
activities at time t, Iit, and a measure of initial wealth in time t-1, Wt-1. The discount
factor is δ t . Profit is specified as the difference of costs and revenue. Revenue is the
summation of the product of price, yield, and acres planted: the price Pit of the ith crop at
time t, yield per acre Ψit of crop i at time t subject to land quality φ, and acres planted Ait
of the ith crop at time t.
Costs are a summation of fixed and variable costs associated with each crop i.
The cost of input j associated with the ith crop at time t is the product of ω ijt , the unit cost
of input j, and Xijt, the amount of input j associated with ith crop at time t. Let rit be the
per-acre cost of the land input associated with the ith crop at time t. Thus, for a tenant
farmer renting or leasing land, rit is the rental rate of land for the ith crop at time t; for a
owner, rit is the opportunity cost associated with using the acreage for the next best use.
Cit are fixed costs associated with the ith crop at time t and are a function of production
decisions in the previous time period, meaning that acreage decisions are inter-temporal.
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The model has two constraints: first, the farmer is constrained by the technology
he employs. Output Ψ it φ Ait is a function of all inputs Xijt, acres planted Ait, and a
stochastic element εit covering exogenous variants such as weather. Output is constrained
by the farmer’s production function. Second, it is possible to optimize profit by having
idle acreage Aidle. Thus, if both harvested acreage and idle acreage are be included in the
profit maximization model, then the constraint binds. As time is an element of the model,
acreage planted (At) is not fixed, and At-1 can be greater than, equal to, or less than current
acreage as farmers buy, rent, or lease more land:

∑A ≠ ∑A
t

t −1

.

Production decisions are made with output price and yield uncertainty. Xijt and Ait
are choice variables and all other variable are exogenous. Costs from inputs are assumed
known when acreage decisions are made because most costs are sustained at planting.
Thus, within the profit function, uncertainty lies within revenue, not costs. Hence, yield
and output price are treated as random variables.
First Order Conditions without Government Payments
Without loss of generality, Equations (4.2) and (4.3) below illustrate the necessary
first order conditions corresponding to the farmer’s utility maximization problem
summarized in Equation (4.1).

(4.2)


  ∂ F (Xijt , Aijt , ε it )
∂V

= δ t  Pit 
ω
−

ijt = 0
∂ Xijt
∂ Xijt

 





(4.3)


  ∂ F (Xijt , Ait , ε it )


∂V
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∂
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Equation (4.2) illustrates the standard profit maximizing condition where the
input’s value of its respective marginal product is equal to its own input price, ω ijt , for
each time t, crop i and input j. Equation (4.3) expresses the same is true of acreage; the
value of the marginal product is equal to the rental rate rit, for each time t and crop i.
However, there is an additional term for time period t-1, because, acreage decisions are
inter-temporal. For each first order condition, changes in output and input prices will
change inputs and acreage. Equations (4.1) – (4.3) will be used as a baseline to compare
the next three models.
Profit Maximization with Price Supports
Now consider price supports PSit, a form of fully coupled government payments
to farmers. PSit is the sum of all per-unit subsidies and deficiency payments at price Pit.
For example, farmers planting a specific commodity may receive a deficiency payment
contingent to the set target price per commodity and the quantity produced. Equation
(4.4) is the farmer’s expected utility maximization problem with price supports:
(4.4)

T

V = Max E  ∑U δ t gt (⋅) 
{Ait , Xijt }
 t =0


(

)

where gt (⋅) = π tcpld (⋅) + I t + Wt −1
I





J





i =1





j =1





π tcpld (⋅) = ∑ (Pit + PSit )Ψ it φ Ait −  ∑ ω ijt Xijt  + rit Ait + Cit (Ait −1 )
s.t.

(

Ψ it φ Ait ≤ F Xijt , Ait , ε it

)
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I

∑A

it

= At .

i

The profit function π changes to include the additional term PSit as a function of quantity
produced Ψ it φ Ait . Also, the introduction of government payments into the expected
utility function adds uncertainty about policy changes.

Therefore, there is now

uncertainty regarding price, yield, and policy.
First Order Conditions with Price Supports
Because price supports depend on current prices and current production, PSit is
included in the new first-order conditions (4.5) and (4.6) in addition to Pit.

(4.5)



 ∂ F (Xijt , Aijt , ε it )
∂V

= δ t (Pit + PSit )
ω
−

ijt = 0
∂ Xijt
∂
X


ijt






(4.6)



 ∂ F (Xit , Ait , ε it )
∂V
t −1  ∂ Cit (Ait −1 ) 
= δ t (Pit + PSit )
 − rit  − δ 
=0.
∂ Ait
∂ Ait


 ∂ Ait 



Acreage and input decisions depend not only on price and production, but the
government issued price support as well. The first order conditions for truly decoupled
payments will be shown to be the same as those in Equation (4.2) and (4.3) and hence do
not distort production.
Profit Maximization with Decoupled Direct Payments
In theory, fully decoupled government payments should not change the profit
maximizing optimal allocation of choice variables acreage A and inputs X. When the
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term for decoupled direct payments DPt is added to the profit function of Equation (4.1),
the following model is given.
(4.7)

T

V = Max E  ∑U δ t gt (⋅) 
{Ait , Xijt }
 t =0


(
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where gt (⋅) = π tdp (⋅) + I t + Wt −1
I
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j =1





π tdp (⋅) = ∑  Pit Ψ it φ Ait −  ∑ ω ijt Xijt  + rit Ait + Cit (Ait −1 ) + DPt (⋅)

(

)

DPt = ∑ α it Sit Ψ iH (FH (Xi , Ai , ε i ))Bit (AH )
I

i =1

s.t.

(

Ψ it φ Ait ≤ F Xijt , Ait , ε it
I

∑A

it

)

= At .

i

Fully decoupled payments (e.g., fixed direct payments, production flexibility contracts)
are represented by equation DPt (⋅) defined as a summation over crop i and are a function
of an α percentage of S payment per crop, historic yield ΨH per crop i, and base acres Bt
for each crop i. For example, production flexibility contracts introduced in the 1996
Farm Bill calculated historic yield as an average of 1991-1994 base years, therefore
farmers lacked ability to change production practices in order to manipulate the
calculation of historic yield. Historic yield is a function of the production function in a
historic time period H and base acres are a function of historic acreage AH. Thus,
decoupled direct payments are not a function of current prices, production, or inputs.
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Within the DP function, the only variables that vary in time t relate to the amount of
support α it Sit each farmer receives, which depends on the policy in place at that time.
First Order Conditions with Decoupled Direct Payments
As mentioned before, fully decoupled payments do not change the optimal
allocation of inputs and acreage relative to no government payments, as seen in the first
order conditions (4.8) and (4.9) below.

(4.8)
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Because the policy is enacted after farmers have already made decisions in the
historic time period H, Equations (4.8) and (4.9) are identical to Equations (4.2) and (4.3)
when farmers receive no government payments. Thus, if decoupled direct payments are
fully decoupled, there will be no production distortion due to the government payments,
unlike coupled payments. Lastly, an additional term is added to allow for farmer’s
expectations of updating of base acres and yields as well as updating due to changes in
government policies, a potential coupling mechanism reviewed in Chapter Three.
Profit Maximization with Decoupled Direct Payments and Updating
The literature reviewed in previous chapters also suggests that uncertainty about
changes in future decoupled payments impacts a farmer’s decisions today (Bhaskar &
Beghin, 2010; Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008). Borrowing a term from Bhaskar and
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Beghin (2010) that allows for expected updating, the farmer’s utility maximization
problem can be rewritten as

T

ˆ
(4.10) V = Max E  ∑U δ t gt (⋅) + δ t ht (⋅) 
{Ait , Xijt }
 t =0


(

)

where g(⋅) = π tdp (⋅) + I t + Wt −1
I



J



i =1



j =1



π tdp (⋅) = ∑  Pit Ψ it φ Ait − (∑ ω ijt Xijt ) + rit Ait + Cit (Ait −1 ) + DPt (⋅)
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I

i =1

ht (⋅) = γ VB + (1 − γ )VNB
s.t.
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Ψ it φ Ait ≤ F Xijt , Ait , ε it
I
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it

)

= At

i

γ = [0,1] .
The function ht (⋅) introduces a term from Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) that allows for the
future policy benefits to depend on whether or not updating actually occurs and accounts
for the farmer’s expectation of updating occurring. Let γ be the farmer’s subjective
probability of future base and/or yield updating. If γ = 0 , a farmer does not expect
updating will be allowed in future policies. If γ = 1 , a farmer is 100 percent certain that
base updating will be allowed in future farm policies. The function ht (⋅) is discounted
ˆ
using the discount factor δ t , where tˆ corresponds to the time period in which the future
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payment benefits are realized. VB is defined as the value of the payment if updating
occurs, and VNB is the value of the payment if updating does not occur. If no updating is
the true state of the world, then VNB is awarded. Conversely, if updating is the true state
of the world, then VB is awarded.
First Order Conditions with Decoupled Direct Payments and Updating
Without loss of generality, equations (4.11) and (4.12) below illustrates the
necessary first order conditions corresponding to the farmer’s utility maximization
problem summarized in equation (4.10).

(4.11)
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where DPt (⋅) = ∑ α it Sit Ψ iH (FH (Xi , Ai , ε i ))Bit (AH ) .
I

i =1

Equation (4.11) consists of two parts: the first term is the standard profit maximizing
condition where the value of the marginal product is equal to the input price, ωijt. The
second term is due to updating. Note that the two terms have different discount factors
due to the fact that the farmer receives part of the benefit in time t and part of the benefits
in time tˆ . Equation (4.12) expresses the same is true of acreage: the value of the
marginal product is equal to the rental rate rit, for each time t and crop i plus an additional
term included due to updating. However, there is an additional term for time period t-1,
because, as previously mentioned, acreage decisions are inter-temporal.
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If farmers have a non-zero subjective probability of updating, there is a
connection between decoupled payments and input use.

For each first order condition,

the larger γ, the greater the link between current acreage and input decisions and future
program crop payments. If γ = 0 , then the term included for expectations of updating
becomes zero and decoupled payments are not coupled to production through
expectations of updating. If γ ∈(0,1], the expectations of updating act as a coupling
mechanism between decoupled direct payments and production thus leading to current
production distortions. Based on findings of Coble, Miller, and Hudson (2008), 13 it is
expected that γ > 0 will be true for some, but not all farmers. The first order conditions
allow decoupled payments to impact production decisions through increased acreage
(extensive margin), via changing the mix of crops, or changing other input use to result in
higher yields (intensive margin).
Updating was allowed twice since the introduction of decoupled payments in
1996. The 2002 FSRI Act introduced two new types of decoupled direct payment (fixed
direct payments and counter-cyclical payments) that effectively changed the way base
acres and yield were determined as well as expanded the number of program crops
eligible for program benefits allowing farmers to reallocate their base acres. 14
The FCE Act of 2008 created another way in which updating to base acres and
yield may occur. The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program introduced in

13

In a 2005 survey conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics Survey (NASS), 38 to 42 percent of
respondents from Iowa and Mississippi expected base acreage and yield updating would be allowed in the
2008 Farm Bill.
14
See Appendix A for specific information on changes to program yields and acres.
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2008 set historic yield to an Olympic moving average, meaning that each year the historic
period H changes. This policy may implicitly create a link between current acreage and
input decisions and future program crop payments. For completion, the following model
combines fully coupled, decoupled, and other lump sum government payments that do
not effect production.
Profit Maximization with All Government Payments and Updating
Combining the elements of Equations (4.4), (4.7), and (4.10) and adding an
additional term Gt for other lump sum government payments produces the following
expected utility maximization problem.

T

ö
(4.13) V = Max E  ∑U δ t gt (⋅) + δ t ht (⋅) 
{ Ait , X ijt }
 t =0


(
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I



J



i =1



j =1
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γ = [0,1] .
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The profit function now includes price supports PSit, decoupled direct payments DPt, and
lump sum payments Gt, which can include conservation payments such as the
Conservation Reserve Program or Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP). It
is evident that although Gt increase total expected utility, it does not depend directly on
Inclusion of ht (⋅) allows for the

the choice variables acreage Ait and inputs Xijt.
possibility of updating.

First Order Conditions with All Government Payments and Updating
Equations (4.14) and (4.15) are the first order conditions. Note that the term PSit
is again included in the optimal allocation of choice variables acreage and inputs.

(4.14)
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where DPt (⋅) = ∑ α it Sit Ψ iH (FH (Xi , Ai , ε i ))Bit (AH ) .
I
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Government payments Gt are not included in either first order condition, illustrating that
they do not influence production decisions. As in Equation (4.10) and (4.13), the larger
γ, the greater the link between current acreage and input decisions and future program
crop payments. If γ = 0 then Equations (4.14) and (4.15) will be equivalent to Equations
(4.5) and (4.6), the optimal allocations of acreage and inputs with price supports.
Summary
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This chapter examines the role of government payments and expectations of
updating within five potential expected utility maximization problems by illustrating how
coupled and decoupled payments can affect the farmer’s optimal allocation of acreage
and inputs.

Although the equations presented in Chapter Four do not capture all five

coupling mechanisms discussed in the previous chapter, the equations capture three key
aspects of the literature reviewed.

Production distortions can be calculated at the

extensive margin through changes in total acreage, the intensive margin through changes
in the amounts of inputs used, and through changes in crop mix.
Truly decoupled direct payments do not affect a farmer’s optimal allocation of
acreage or inputs as the payments are based on historic, not current, production.
However, if a farmer expects updating to occur, either through government policy
changes or the implicit design of the policy itself (in the case of ACRE), he or she may
alter current farm production decisions in order to optimize future profits. The magnitude
of the effects of decoupled direct payments on input use, like fertilizer and other
agricultural chemicals, depends on the discount rate δ , the subjective probability of
updating ( γ ), and the payout rate of decoupled farm subsidies ( α it Sit ) relative to the size
of coupled price supports (PSit). For example, if a farmer has a low discount factor, he is
willing to allocate more resources to the future and may increase planting today to
increase base acres and yields to reap future benefits. A farmer with a high discount
factor may be less willing to change current production decisions to obtain future
benefits.
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The following chapters use weighted ordinary least squares regression to test the
following hypothesis: there exists a positive and significant relationship between both
coupled government payments and decoupled direct payments and the use of agricultural
chemicals. Although the relationship between both coupled government payments and
decoupled direct payments and agricultural chemical use is expected to be positive, the
magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments may be greater than or less than the
effect of coupled government payments depending on the size of coupled price supports
(PSit) and decoupled farm subsidies ( α it Sit ), the subjective probability of updating ( γ ),
and the discount rate ( δ ).
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CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGY
The objective of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that there is a positive and
significant relationship between both coupled and decoupled direct government payments
and the use of agricultural chemicals. The magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct
payments relative to coupled government payments depends on the size of coupled price
supports (PSit) and decoupled farm subsidies ( α it Sit ), the subjective probability of
updating ( γ ), and the discount rate δ . Additionally, structural breaks are expected
corresponding to the timing of policy changes.

Weighted ordinary least squares

regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis.
Data
Cross-sectional data collected annually by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) is used in the analysis. From 1984 to 1995 Farm Cost and Returns Surveys
(FCRS) were collected from a representative sampling of farmers; in 1996 these surveys
were replaced with Agricultural Resources and Management Survey (ARMS)
questionnaires. In order to identify changes in the use of fertilizer and other agricultural
chemicals due to the initial implementation of decoupled direct payments in 1996 with
the passing of the FAIR Act and/or policy changes in 2002 (FSRI) and 2008 (FCE), data
from 1991 to 2008 is analyzed. FCRS was collected annually from farmers and was
comprised of questions relating to farm-level expenditures and returns while other
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surveys were used to gather information about cropping practices and input use on a
field-level. In 1996, ARMS surveys integrated FCRS and the other surveys into one
multi-phase, stratified, and probability-weighted dataset (Dubman, 2000).

Farmers

selected to participate in answering the ARMS surveys are asked questions regarding
both the farm business and household. Participation is not mandated and farmers do not
participate year after year.
ARMS data is collected in three phases: in Phase I, farmers are asked questions
concerning what commodities have been planted that year. This phase occurs in the
summer months and acts as a screening process for Phase II and III.

Phase II is

conducted in the fall and winter and asks randomly selected farmers from Phase I
questions pertaining to cropping and management practices, production inputs, and
commodity specific production costs. Phase II data is collected at the field level and
focuses on a specific crop, but not all commodities are surveyed every year. Lastly,
Phase III data is collected in the spring of the following year from a representative
sample of farmers, including some who have already participated in Phase II. Phase III
data is collected at the farm-level and includes questions regarding farm business and
household finances and farm management practices, including operating expenses such
as fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals. The number of farms surveyed during the
Phase III process exceeds the number of farms surveyed during the Phase II process.
FCRS and Phase III ARMS data is used in this thesis. This data was selected
because it contains information on decoupled payments, value of production, output,
input expenses, and other farm and farmer characteristics at the farm-level. ARMS and
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FCRS data are also beneficial because of the known sampling weights. Each observation
is then given a weight reflecting the probability of being selected; therefore, population
estimates can be constructed using a much smaller sample size than would otherwise be
required. The weights (or expansion factors) change each year to reflect changes in the
population as a whole (Dubman, 2000). All results are obtained using the appropriate
weights.
Study Observations
Because only farmers with historic plantings of the eleven program crops receive
decoupled direct payments, 15 the analysis is limited to farmers with more than 50 percent
of their total value of production coming from program crop commodities. This also
eliminates livestock farms. Therefore, any farmer with more than half of the total value
of production coming from the following commodities is included in the analysis: general
cash grain, wheat, corn, soybean, sorghum, rice, cotton, peanut, and other. General cash
grain crops refer to farms that are not specializing in a specific crop, but the sum of
barley, corn, oats, rice, sorghum, soybean and wheat makes up at least half of all sales
revenue. Oilseeds and pulse crops (e.g., lentils, large chick peas, and small chick peas)
are categorized under ‘other.’
The U.S. farming sector is made up of many very diverse geographic regions:
farming conditions in California are very different than farming conditions in Kansas.

15

As of 2008, program crops include barley, corn, cotton, oats, oilseeds, peanuts, pulse crops, rice,
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat.
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The USDA created nine ‘farm resource regions’ 16 in 1995 to help group farmland into
more homogenous production zones based on geographic similarities, replacing the ten
‘production regions’ previously used to classify farmland in the US.

These early

production regions followed state boundaries, “necessarily group[ing] unlike areas
together because a single State often encompasses different soils and typography”
(Heimlich, 2000).

For example, prior to 1995, the Appalachian production region

grouped Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, and North Carolina together
because of geographic proximity.

However, those five states do not share similar

production practices due to difference in soil, climate, and land use across the states;
current resource regions designate these states to five different regions.
Thus, this analysis focuses on only the Heartland region. The Heartland spreads
across 543 counties in nine states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota. However, only three states are wholly
contained in the Heartland: Indiana, Illinois and Iowa. The other six states only have
some counties included in the Heartland, while the other parts of the state are categorized
in different resource regions. For example, it appears that all but the southernmost
counties of Missouri are in the Heartland; the southern border with Arkansas is
categorized as Eastern Uplands.

Since the current regional classifications were not

developed until 1995, this analysis focuses on an extended Heartland region
encompassing all counties located in the nine states listed above. The Heartland region
was chosen for several reasons. First, the Heartland boasts the largest concentration of
16

The nine regions are: Basin and Range, Northern Great Plains, Heartland, Northern Crescent, Eastern
Uplands, Southern Seaboard, Mississippi Portal, Prairie Gateway, and the Fruitful Rim (Heimlich, 2000)
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cropland (27 percent of the nation’s cropland) and crop value (23 percent) (Heimlich,
2000). Second, all but one program crop, peanuts, is grown there, thus farmers in this
region face growing conditions that enable them to change their crop mix in order to
maximize profits.
The analysis is also limited to include only farms where the primary operator
claims their occupation as farm work. Farmers that have other sources of income and are
farming as a hobby or in retirement might engage in a different production decisionmaking process. Lastly, the analysis is restricted to only include farms with total acres
operated greater than zero. 17 It seems counterintuitive to report negative acres operated
on a farm, however, land owners may rent or lease farm acres to other farmers through a
sharecropping or rental agreement; this land is then deducted from the total number of
acres owned by the primary operator, rented from others, or leased from others (ERS,
2003). Negative total acres operated would therefore suggest that more land was being
rented out or leased to other producers than operated by the primary operator. In that
regard, more income may come from renting land than actual production, so farms with
negative operating acres are not included in the analysis.
Creating Weighted Average Costs
One clear way that fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use is affected is
through changes in the prices of these two groups of inputs. Phase III data only asks
about the total dollar amount spent on fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals, not the
17

This limitation of the dataset is particularly important as almost all variables are adjusted with respect to
total acres operated: having negative acres operated would change the sign of independent and dependent
variables.
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prices paid. Phase II data, however, does ask farmers about the per acre cost of fertilizer
and other agricultural chemicals for a given commodity. Recall that Phase II data is
collected annually, but not for all crops. Table 5.1 shows that from 1991 to 2008, each
program crop nationwide has been surveyed only two to four times. Additionally, Phase
II data is not collected at all for oilseeds, pulse crops, or peanuts.
Table 5.1. National Commodity
Survey Years, 1991 – 2008
Barley
1992 2003
Corn
1991 1996 2001 2005
Cotton
1991 1997 2003 2007
Oats
1994 2005
Rice
1992 2000 2006
Sorghum 1995 2003
Soybeans 1996 2002 2006
Wheat
1994 1998 2004
Source: ERS 2009

The Economic Research Service division of the USDA aggregates cost data from
Phase II ARMS data and FCRS data prior to 1996 in a Cost and Returns Report estimated
at a regional level. Before 1996, Cost and Return regions change annually depending on
the number of farms in each state producing the surveyed crop. Prior to 1996, the region
that best overlaps states in the extended Heartland region is the North Central region.
However, aggregate prices are only calculated in that region for corn, wheat, oats, and
soybeans.
The Heartland resource region average fertilizer and other agricultural chemical
costs per acre are reported for these seven crops: barley, corn, cotton, oats, sorghum,
soybeans, and wheat. For this research, Cost and Returns Reports from the Heartland
resource region are used after 1996 and from the North Central region for years 1991
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through 1995. Table 5.2 summarizes the states included in the Cost and Return reports
used to create commodity specific regional prices of fertilizer and other agricultural
chemicals.
Table 5.2. Commodities Surveyed in the North Central and
Heartland Regions, 1991 – 2008
1991-1995
1996-2008
Barley
Heartland
Corn
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Heartland
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and
Wisconsin
Cotton
Heartland
Oats
Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Heartland
Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin
Rice
Sorghum
Heartland
Soybeans Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Heartland
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and
Wisconsin
Wheat
Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio
Heartland
and Michigan
Source: ERS 2009. Notes: The Heartland includes 543 counties in nine states: Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota.

ERS creates annual estimates for the years not surveyed by using price indices
and USDA crop production and price statistics from other sources to better reflect yearto-year changes. Even so, technological changes or changes in survey techniques leave
gaps in annual estimates for input costs (ERS, 2009). From the combined North Central
and Heartland data, pricing information is missing for barley (1991-2002), cotton (19911996), sorghum (1991-1994), and soybeans (1997-2001). In the years missing, a 6 year
adjusted price average is calculated in place of the ERS estimated price.
The commodity specific average fertilizer and other agricultural chemical costs
per acre are used to create a farm-level weighted average cost of fertilizer (WACF) and a
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farm-level weighted average cost of agricultural chemicals (WACAC) for each far in the
sample:
(5.1)

7
A 
WACF = ∑ PitF  it 
 ATt 
i =1

(5.2)

7
A 
WACAC = ∑ PitAC  it  .
 ATt 
i =1

In the first equation, PitF is the per acre cost of fertilizer for commodity i in time t and is
multiplied by the ratio of acres harvested of commodity i in time t (Ait) to total acres
harvested of the seven program crops with fertilizer price information in time t (ATt).
Equation (5.2) is identical to Equation (5.1) except PitAC , the per acre cost of agricultural
chemicals for commodity i in time t replaces PitF . All PitF and PitAC are adjusted using the
producer price index for pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical
manufacturing 18 to account for inflation and other year-to-year changes. WACF and
WACAC are used in the regression equations as a measure of prices for fertilizer and
other agricultural chemicals, respectively .
Model
Variables
Given the hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between agricultural
chemical use and government payments (both coupled and decoupled), the effects of
these payments on fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals expenditures is estimated
18

Pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical manufacturing is industry code 3253.
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using weighted ordinary least squares regression (OLS) while controlling for other farm
and farmer characteristics. As previously mentioned, decoupled direct payments are
given on the farm level, so Phase III data is well suited for this investigation. However,
Phase III data does not contain data on fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use, only
total expenditures. Thus, fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures act as the
measures of fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use.

These expenditures are

normalized with respect to total acres operated to control for farm size.
Thus, the two dependent variables are adjusted fertilizer expenditures per total
acres operated (FERT) and adjusted other agricultural chemical expenditures per total
acres operated (CHEM). CHEM includes all agricultural chemicals not classified as
fertilizer. Both dependent variables are adjusted using the producer price index for
pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical manufacturing. While the analysis
would be improved by using quantities of fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals
rather than expenditures, this information is not readily available.
A list of all variables used in the OLS regressions can be found in Table 5.3.
WACF and WACAC are included as independent variables and serve as a measure of the
input price of the dependent variables FERT and CHEM, respectively. An increase in
WACF is expected to increase FERT; an increase in WACAC is expected to increase
CHEM.
Several farm and farm characteristics are also included in the analysis. Harvested
acres of the seven program crops used to calculate the weighted average cost functions
are included in the analysis as independent variables (HBARLEY, HCORN, HCOTTON,
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HOATS, HSORGH, HSOY, and HWHEAT).

These variables are normalized with

respect to total acres operated. Expected signs for these variables are unclear. Since the
variables are normalized, an increase in harvested acres of any one of the seven crops
necessarily changes the crop mix. For example, if harvested acres of oats divided by total
acres operated per farm (HOATS) decreases but total acres operated remains the same,
the acres of oats must have been replaced by another crop or idled. If the replacement
crop uses more fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals per acre, the decrease in
HOATS will increase FERT and CHEM. If HOATS is replaced with crop using less
fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals, the relationship will be negative. Total acres
operated per farm (ACRESOP) is included as a size control since economies of size may
be possible.
A measure of wealth is also included (WEALTH) in the regression model,
calculated as total farm financial assets less total farm financial debts per total acres
operated, adjusted using CPI. The expected sign for wealth is unclear. As wealth
increases, fertilizer and agricultural chemical expenditures may increase because more
funds are available; this would be particularly true at low levels of wealth. Conversely,
since fertilizers and agricultural chemicals may act as possible insurance against low
yield (Ramaswami, 1992; Hennessy 1998), there is an incentive for farmers with low
levels of wealth to apply more fertilizers and pesticides.

60

Table 5.3. Variables Used in Weighted OLS Regression Analysis
Exp.
Definition
Sign
Fertilizer expenditures divided by total acres operated,
adjusted using PPI
CHEM
Agricultural chemical expenditures divided by total acres
operated, adjusted using PPI
HBARLEY
Harvested acres of barley divided by total acres operated
(+ or -)
HCORN
Harvested acres of corn divided by total acres operated
(+ or -)
HCOTTON
Harvested acres of cotton divided by total acres operated
(+ or -)
HOATS
Harvested acres of oats divided by total acres operated
(+ or -)
HSORGH
Harvested acres of sorghum divided by total acres operated
(+ or -)
HSOY
Harvested acres of soybean divided by total acres operated
(+ or -)
HWHEAT
Harvested acres of wheat divided by total acres operated
(+ or -)
ACRESOP
Total acres operated per farm
(+)
WEALTH
Total farm financial assets less total farm financial debts
(+ or -)
(wealth) per total acres operated, adjusted using CPI
AGE
Age of primary farm operator
(+ or -)
TENURE
Ratio of owned to operated acres
(+)
DP
Total decoupled direct payments per total acres operated,
(+)
adjusted using CPIa
GOV
Government payments less decoupled payments per total acres (+)
operated, adjusted using CPI
WACF
Weighted average cost of fertilizer, adjusted using PPIb
(+)
WACAC
Weighted average cost of agricultural chemicals, adjusted
(+)
using PPIb
INSURE
Ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm,
(+)
adjusted using CPI
SOLVE
Ratio of total farm financial debt to total farm financial assets
(+)
(solvency), adjusted using CPI
DP*INSURE Interaction term: decoupled direct payments & insurance
(-)
expenditures
DP*SOLVE
Interaction term: decoupled direct payments & solvency
(-)
GOV*INSURE Interaction term: government payments & insurance
(-)
expenditures
GOV*SOLVE Interaction term: government payments & solvency
(-)
TIME
Time trend
(+ or -)
TIMESQ
Time trend squared
(+ or -)
COUNTY
County dummy variables
(+ or -)
Variable
FERT

Notes: a- Decoupled payments includes production flexibility contracts, fixed direct payments, and
counter-cyclical payments. b- WACF and WACAC include prices for all seven crops in model.
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Two additional farmer characteristics that may contribute to changes in FERT and
CHEM are the age of the primary operator (AGE) and the ratio of owned to operated
acres (TENURE). The primary operator’s total years of farm experience (YEARSEXP)
are not available for all years examined, so age is used as a proxy. 19 The age of the
primary operator may be positively or negatively related to fertilizer and other
agricultural chemical use. A young operator may be more inclined to minimize fertilizer
and chemical use due to concerns about health and/or the environment, while an older
operator may be more knowledgeable about crop production and be able to reduce
fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use through learning from past experiences.
TENURE may affect FERT and CHEM because landowners may have a greater incentive
to increase yields by increasing their use of production inputs. The expected sign for
TENURE is therefore positive. Furthermore, decoupled direct payments are paid to the
operator of the farm, not the owner; however an estimated 20 to 25 percent of the
payment is capitalized into increased rental rates (Kirwan, 2009). Hence, tenure is an
important variable.
Decoupled direct payments and all other government payments are represented by
GOV and DP, respectively. DP includes production flexibility contracts, fixed direct
payments, and countercyclical payments received by farmers. GOV is calculated as all
other government payments.

ARMS and FCRS surveys do not always distinguish

between coupled payments, such as deficiency payments, and lump sum payments, such

19

For the years 2002 through 2008, AGE and YEARSEXP have a correlation coefficient of 0.80.
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as conservation program payments. Therefore, GOV represents coupled and lump sum
payments. Both variables are adjusted using CPI.
Two measures of risk aversion are included in the model: INSURE and SOLVE.
Following Goodwin and Mishra’s (2006) estimation of a farmer’s level of risk, INSURE
is the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm, adjusted using CPI. The
more risk averse a farmer is, the more insurance he may purchase relative to other
expenditures, therefore, the expected sign is positive if fertilizer and other agricultural
chemicals are risk reducing inputs. However, currently there is some debate in the
literature regarding whether these inputs are risk reducing or risk increasing (Horowitz &
Lichtenberg, 1993; Rajsic, Weersink, & Gandorfer, 2009; Ramaswami, 1992).
SOLVE is the solvency ratio measured as total farm financial debt to total farm
financial assets, adjusted using CPI. Solvency acts as a proxy for the farm’s level of
credit constraint and financial risk. A farmer that is less solvent may increase the use of
risk reducing inputs to insure a good yield in order to avoid defaulting on debt
obligations. Second, solvency indicates whether a farmer is credit constrained: the more
debt a farmer has, the less likely he can access more credit. Goodwin and Mishra (2006)
use a variable similar to SOLVE as a proxy for a farmer’s degree of credit constraint,
thus testing the hypothesis that decoupled direct payments affect the degree of credit
constraint and is a coupling mechanism for decoupled payments. A positive sign for
SOLVE can therefore suggest two things: financially risky farmers view fertilizer and
other agricultural chemicals as risk reducing inputs, and if a farmer is credit constrained
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and decoupled payments relax the credit constraint conditions, then this provides a
possible coupling mechanism. SOLVE is expected to have a positive sign.
Four

interaction

terms

(DP*INSURE,

DP*GOV,

GOV*INSURE,

and

GOV*SOLVE) are also included in the models to allow both government payments and
decoupled payments to vary with different levels of risk aversion and solvency. A
negative sign is expected for all interaction terms.

At low levels of INSURE and

SOLVE, the marginal effects of both GOV and DP on FERT and CHEM increase with
increasing levels of INSURE and SOLVE. However, at higher levels of INSURE, the
marginal effects of both GOV and DP on FERT and CHEM are expected to decrease due
to wealth effects (Hennessy, 1998). At higher levels of SOLVE, the marginal effects of
both GOV ad DP on both dependent variables are expected to increase due to reduced
credit constraints (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006).
Since the data spans 17 years, a time trend is included in the model. A positive
sign for TIME implies that from 1991 to 2008, fertilizer or agricultural chemical use has
increased due to technological advances or other changes not captured by other regressors
in the model. A positive sign for TIMESQ would imply this is occurring at an increasing
rate.

The expected signs of these variables are uncertain.

Increased use of plants

genetically modified to encourage greater yields may reduce the amounts of either
production input being applied. On the other hand, increased use of low-tillage crop
management may increase the use of agricultural chemicals because more weeds grow on
low- or no-till land.
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Lastly, dummy variables for each county (COUNTY) are included in the model to
account for variability not captured by the other regressors, including: 1) transportation
costs for volatile fertilizers that may change across counties, 2) soil and land quality that
may differ across counties, and 3) unobserved growing conditions, such as drought and
disease, that vary by county.
Regression Equations
The models can be summarized by Equations (5.3) and (5.4).

The only

differences between the variables used in these equations are the dependent variables and
the weighted average cost functions. Note that there is no intercept in the model to allow
all county dummies to remain in the model for ease of interpretation. Additionally,
HCROP is a term used to identify harvested acres divided by total acres operated of the
seven program crops in the model: barley (HBARLEY), corn (HCORN), cotton
(HCOTTON), oats (HOATS), sorghum (HSORGH), soybeans (HSOY), and wheat
(HWHEAT). By not aggregating harvested crops into one variable, changes in input use
through changes to the intensive margin can be observed through changes in crop mix
and farming acreage more intensely.
7

FERT = ∑ α i HCROPi + α 8 ACRESOP + α 9WEALTH + α10 DP + α11GOV +
i =1

(5.3)

α12 AGE + α13TENURE + α14WACF + α15 INSURE + α16 SOLVE +
α17 DP * INSURE + α18 DP * SOLVE + α19GOV * INSURE + α 20GOV * SOLVE +
K

α 21TIME + α 22TIMESQ + ∑ α k COUNTYk + ε
k =1
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7

CHEM = ∑ βi HCROPi + β 8 ACRESOP + β 9WEALTH + β10 DP + β11GOV
i =1

(5.4)

+ β12 AGE + β13TENURE + β14WACAC + β15 INSURE + β16 SOLVE +
.
β17 DP * INSURE + β18 DP * SOLVE + β19GOV * INSURE + β 20GOV * SOLVE +
K

β 21TIME + β 22TIMESQ + ∑ β k COUNTYk + ε
k =1

The mathematical interpretations of the coefficient for AGE is:
(5.5)

∂FERT
= α12 .
∂AGE

In practical terms, this means that holding all else constant, a one-year increase in the age
of the primary operator increases fertilizer expenditures by approximately α12.
Interpretations of non-interaction terms are similar to that of AGE.
The mathematical interpretations of the effects of DP and GOV are
(5.6)

∂FERT
= α10 + α17 INSURE + α18 SOLVE
∂DP

(5.7)

∂CHEM
= β10 + β17 INSURE + β18 SOLVE
∂DP

(5.8)

∂FERT
= α11 + α19 INSURE + α 20 SOLVE
∂GOV

(5.9)

∂CHEM
= β11 + β19 INSURE + β 20 SOLVE .
∂GOV

Equations (5.6) and (5.7) illustrate that the marginal effect of decoupled direct payments
(DP) on FERT and CHEM depends upon the direct effect captured in coefficients α10 and
β10 and the indirect effects from decoupled direct payment’s interaction with INSURE
and SOLVE. Similarly, Equations (5.8) and (5.9) illustrate that the marginal effect of
other government payments (GOV) on FERT and CHEM depends upon the direct effect
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captured in coefficients α10 and β10 and the indirect effects from other government
payment’s interaction with INSURE and SOLVE. As INSURE and SOLVE change, so
will the marginal effects of decoupled direct payments and government payments on
fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use. For completeness, the marginal effects of
INSURE and SOLVE are calculated as well:
(5.10)

∂FERT
= α15 + α17 DP + α19GOV
∂INSURE

(5.11)

∂CHEM
= β15 + β17 DP + β19GOV
∂INSURE

(5.12)

∂FERT
= α16 + α18 DP + α 20GOV
∂SOLVE

(5.13)

∂CHEM
= β16 + β18 DP + β 20GOV .
∂SOLVE
Testing Structural Breaks
Structural breaks in 1996, 2002, and 2008 are expected due to policy changes in

those years. Chow tests are conducted to test for structural breaks at the time the policy
change occurred. Chow tests are used in time-series data to test if coefficients of one
segment of the data are statistically significantly different than the coefficients of a
second time period (Chow, 1960). If decoupled direct payments increase fertilizer and
other agricultural chemical use, a structural break may appear in 1996. If updating
changes farmer’s decisions about production inputs, specifically fertilize and agricultural
chemicals, a structural break will be found in 2002. Because there is no data available
after 2008, the hypothesis that changes in the 2008 Farm Bill lead to a structural break
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cannot be tested using this data. Chow tests are conducted comparing a model using the
whole data series (data from 1991 to 2008) to the restricted model that allows all
coefficients to change at three different subsets: 1991-1995 (years without decoupled
direct payments), 1996-2001 (years following the introduction of decoupled payments),
and 2002-2008 (years after the policy updating occurred in 2002).
An iterative Chow test is also conducted to estimate if the structural breaks due to
policy implementation occurred slightly before or after the implementation, suggesting
that farmers may anticipate new policy changes or, alternatively, have a lagged response
to new policy changes. Breaks are considered for one and two years before and after
1996 and 2002. Since there was an additional policy change in 2008 creating ACRE, an
additional break in 2006 is also assessed. This iterative Chow test procedure requires 48
additional tests to be run for each model, with the highest F-statistic determining the best
fit structural breaks (Bai & Perron, 2003).
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CHAPTER SIX
RESULTS
Implementing the methodology discussed in the previous chapter, the hypothesis
that there exists a positive and significant relationship between both coupled government
payments and decoupled direct payments and the use of agricultural chemicals and
fertilizer is tested. Although a positive sign is expected for both types of payments, the
magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments may be greater than or less than the
magnitude of the effect of coupled government payments, depending on the size of
coupled price supports (PSit) relative to decoupled farm subsidies ( α it Sit ), the subjective
probability of updating ( γ ), and the discount rate δ . Descriptive statistics are presented
and then the weighted ordinary least squares regression results for each specified model
are examined.
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are derived using data collected in the 1991 to 1995 Farm Cost
and Reports Survey and the 1996 to 2008 Agricultural Resources and Management
Survey by the National Statistics Service (NASS), United States Department of
Agriculture. Any interpretations and conclusions derived from the data represent the
author’s views and not necessarily those of NASS.
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Table 6.1. Summary Statistics, 1991-2008
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
FERT
$16.48
$138.28
CHEM
$12.08
$100.05
WACF
$25.40
$76.97
WACAC
$16.72
$50.70
ABARLEY*
1.93
248.64
ACORN*
224.91
3298.34
ACOTTON*
1.08
384.22
AOATS*
2.09
177.66
AOILSEED*
2.18
337.55
APEANUT*
0.00
0.00
APULSE*
1.35
225.94
ARICE*
0.64
256.03
ASORGH*
4.70
347.36
ASOY*
207.44
2926.94
AWHEAT*
41.05
1706.81
HCORN+
0.32
2.24
+
HCOTTON
0.001
0.27
HSORGH+
0.01
0.46
+
HSOY
0.30
2.09
HBARLEY+
0.002
0.20
HOATS+
0.01
0.27
+
HWHEAT
0.04
1.04
ACRESOP
671.44
8,436.66
TENURE
0.56
9.31
AGE
54
15
YEARSEXP*
29.80
14.0
WEALTH
$1,198.03
$43,369.70
NINCOME*
$52,295.87
$133,540.57
INSURE
0.06
0.54
SOLVE
0.10
5.68
DP
$4.88
$73.59
GOV
$9.81
$147.76

Min
$0.00
$0.00
$5.08
$0.66
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.00
0
17
0
$(1,240.24)
$(158,312.26)
0
0
$0.00
$(3.71)

Max
$358.81
$198.28
$53.58
$60.32











1.00
1.00
0.91
1.00
0.75
0.64
0.99

161.00
98
75
$315,709.35
$2,874,809.57
0.83
140.34
$305.25
$545.34

Notes: Number of observations is 25,071 except for WACF and WACAC, which have 24,140
observations, APULSE and AOILSEED, which have 7,214, SOLVE, which has 25,050 observations, and
YEARSEXP, which has 13,957 observations. *Some variables are not in the model: YEARSEXP is
defined as the primary operator’s years of farm experience and NINCOME is defined as net farm
income. Crop variables beginning with A are non-normalized harvested acres of all program crops.
+Crop variables beginning with H represent average proportions of total harvested acres per farm.
Maximums cannot be reported due to disclosure restrictions on the data.
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Table 6.1 contains summary statistics of all variables within the model as well as
two variables that are not included due to endogeneity (net farm income, NINCOME) and
missing observations in some years (primary operator’s years of farm experience,
YEARSEXP). Additionally, summary statistics for non-normalized harvested acres of all
program crops are included (ABARLEY, ACORN, ACOTTON, AOATS, AOILSEED,
APEANUT, APULSE, ASORGH, ASOY, AWHEAT). The sample size is 25,571 for all
but six variables: WACF and WACAC have only 24,140 observations, APULSE and
AOILSEED have 7,214 observations, SOLVE has 25,050 observations, and YEARSEXP
has 13,597 observations.
Farm Characteristics
Between 1991 and 2008, average fertilizer expenditures per acres operated
(FERT) is $16.48, slightly greater than the average other agricultural chemical
expenditure per acres operated (CHEM) of $12.08.

The weighted average cost of

fertilizer is slightly higher than the weighted average cost of other agricultural chemicals,
signifying that fertilizer used on the seven crops present in the model is on average more
expensive per acre to apply than other agricultural chemicals. Alternatively, it is possible
that more fertilizer is used per acre than other agricultural chemicals. The large standard
deviation on both expenditures is most likely due to the differences in what each farm
produces. Since not all farms produce a homogenous mix of crops, per acre expenditures
for production inputs can vary dramatically between farms. An un-pooled t-test shows
that there is not a significant difference in average fertilizer expenditures per acre after
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policy changes occurred in 1996 and 2002. 20 Additionally, an un-pooled t-test comparing
average agricultural chemical expenditures per acre in 1991 through 1995 to 1996
through 2001 found no significant difference in the means. 21 However, a significant
decrease in other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre is found after 2002 relative
to 1996 to 2001 agricultural chemical expenditures: average CHEM between 1996 and
2001 is $13.80/acre and $10.60/acre between 2002 and 2008. 22
Total acres operated (ACRESOP) averaged 671 acres over the 17 years. Of the
total acres operated, 56 percent is owned by the primary operator and the remaining 44
percent is rented (TENURE). Average harvested acres vary widely: average harvested
acres of corn per farm is the highest at 225, followed by soybeans at 207 harvested acres
per farm, and wheat at just 4 harvested acres per farm, on average. Note that peanuts are
not grown in the extended Heartland region and the average acres harvested rice is less
than 1 acre per farm. Neither of these crops is used in the regression analysis because it
is expected that rice and peanuts contribute little to nothing to fertilizer or agricultural
chemical expenditures in the region analyzed.
Corn, wheat, and soybeans are the only crops grown in all nine states sampled,
however corn and soybeans appear to have the largest allotment of harvested acreage
relative to total acres operated. The average farm allocates 32 percent of total acres

20

The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average fertilizer expenditures per acre in 1991-1995 to 1996-2001 is
-0.153 with a reported p-value of 0.878. The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average fertilizer expenditures
per acre in 1996-2001 to 2002-2008 is -0.725 with a reported p-value of 0.234.
21
The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average agricultural chemical expenditures per acre in 1991-1995 to
1996-2001 is -0.859 with a reported p-value of 0.969.
22
The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average fertilizer expenditures per acre in 1996-2001 to 2002-2008 is
2.162 with a reported p-value of 0.031.
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operated to corn (HCORN) and 30 percent to soybeans (HSOY). See Appendix Table
B.1 for a detailed table of average crop harvest per state.

Furthermore, a Pearson

correlation coefficient of 0.28 between HCORN and HSOY suggest that farmers
harvesting corn are likely to harvest soybeans since famers generally produce these two
crops in a rotation or together. Moreover, corn and wheat are negatively correlated with
a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.30, suggesting that wheat is grown when corn is
not.

Barley and wheat are also significantly correlated with a Pearson correlation

coefficient of 0.22. Cotton is only grown in one state, Missouri, with slightly more than
14 acres harvested per farm, on average.
There is a positive and significant 0.52 correlation between harvested corn per
acres operated (HCORN) and fertilizer expenditures (FERT) as well as a 0.45 Pearson
correlation coefficient between harvested corn and agricultural chemical expenditures
(CHEM). On average corn requires the most fertilizers and agricultural chemicals of any
program crop.

Soybeans (HSOY) have the next highest correlations between the

dependent variables FERT and CHEM: 0.23 and 0.39, respectively.
Farmer Characteristics
The average age of the primary farm operator is 54; the youngest farmer in the
sample is 17, the oldest 98. On average, the primary operator has almost 30 years of
experience working on a farm (YEARSEXP). Forty-eight percent of farmers have
graduated from high school and 16 percent have graduated from college. 23 The mean
wealth, adjusted with respect to acres to account for farm size, is approximately $1,200
23

More detailed information can be found in Appendix Figure B.3.
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with a standard deviation of $43,000. Another measure of farm economic status is net
farm income (NINCOME), which is $52,295.87 for this sample with a standard deviation
of $133,540.57. The large standard deviations indicate an uneven distribution of wealth
and income across the sampled farms. In fact, 74 percent of farms have a total value of
production greater than $100,000 annually. On average, farms spend 6 percent of all
expenditures on insurance, including subsidized crop insurance required to participate in
most government crop programs. Lastly, the average farm sampled has a solvency ratio
of 0.10, indicating that the farms in the sample have very little debt on average.
Government Payments
Eighty-eight percent of all sampled farms receive decoupled payments after their
introduction in 1996. Farms collect $7.50 on average in decoupled direct payments (DP)
per operated acre (after 1996) and almost twice that in all other government payments
(GOV). Again, there is a wide range of farms represented and large standard deviations
for both GOV and DP ($147.76 and $73.59, respectively).

Between 1996, when

decoupled payments were introduced, and 2008, the average payment per acre fluctuated
(see Appendix Figure B.1). The first four years saw an almost doubling of DP, followed
by three years of declining payments and then an increase until 2005, when decoupled
payments per acre hit their maximum value of $10.93. Participation in direct decoupled
payment programs (specifically production flexibility contracts, countercyclical
payments, and fixed direct payments) does not seem to follow the same trend, suggesting
that farmers do not enroll in the program in anticipation of higher payments.
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Regression Analysis Results: 1991-2008
To test our hypotheses that both decoupled direct payments and coupled payments
have a significant and positive effect on fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use,
weighted ordinary least squares regression procedures are used to estimate Equations
(6.1) and (6.2) below using the appropriate sample weights. 24 The resulting coefficients
and standard errors are reported in Table 6.2.
7

FERT = ∑ α i HCROPi + α 8 ACRESOP + α 9WEALTH + α10 DP + α11GOV +
i =1

(6.1)

α12 AGE + α13TENURE + α14WACF + α15 INSURE + α16 SOLVE +
α17 DP * INSURE + α18 DP * SOLVE + α19GOV * INSURE + α 20GOV * SOLVE +
K

α 21TIME + α 22TIMESQ + ∑ α k COUNTYk + ε
k =1

7

CHEM = ∑ βi HCROPi + β 8 ACRESOP + β 9WEALTH + β10 DP + β11GOV
i =1

(6.2)

+ β12 AGE + β13TENURE + β14WACAC + β15 INSURE + β16 SOLVE +
β17 DP * INSURE + β18 DP * SOLVE + β19GOV * INSURE + β 20GOV * SOLVE +
K

β 21TIME + β 22TIMESQ + ∑ β k COUNTYk + ε
k =1

Model 1: Fertilizers (1991 – 2008)
The model with fertilizer expenditures per acre as a dependent variable (Model 1)
has 24,118 observations over the 17-year time period of 1991 to 2008. The effects of the
county dummy variables (COUNTY) are not reported due to the large number of counties
in the sample (764 counties are represented). All but two variables (WEALTH and
24

Appropriate weights were assigned using professional expertise from the U.S. Economic Research
Service.
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GOV*SOLVE) have coefficients that are statistically different than zero at a 5 percent
level of significance (Table 6.2).
All harvested acres of program crops per total operated acres have a positive and
significant relationship with fertilizer expenditures, with harvested corn acreage having
the largest coefficient and oats having the smallest.

Although precise relationships

should not be implied by the coefficients, the magnitudes suggest that an increase in
acreage allotted to corn will increase fertilizer expenditures more than a similar increase
in acreage allotted to oats. These results reflect the important role of crop mix in the
consumption of fertilizer.

Total acres operated had a small statistically significant

positive relationship with fertilizer expenditures per acre. This implies the effect of
economies of size is small and a farmer’s crop mix is more important than total acreage
when determining fertilizer expenditures per acre. A positive relationship is also found
between TENURE and FERT: the more land the primary operator owns relative to
renting, the greater fertilizer expenditures per acre are, suggesting that capitalization may
play an important role in input decisions on the farm.
Because of the presence of the four interaction terms (DP*INSURE, DP*SOLVE,
GOV*INSURE, and GOV*SOLVE), Equations (5.6), (5.8), (5.10), and (5.12) presented
in the methodology chapter are used to calculate the marginal effect at the mean of
decoupled direct payments per acre (DP), other government payments per acre (GOV),
the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm (INSURE), and solvency
(SOLVE) on fertilizer expenditures per acre, respectively. 25

25

Marginal effects and the means at which they were calculated are found in Appendix C.
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The marginal effect of INSURE on fertilizer expenditures per acre evaluated at
the mean is -32.25, which is unexpectedly negative. A positive sign is expected for the
effect of insurance expenditures because the more risk-averse a farmer is the more he
should increase his use of risk-reducing inputs such as fertilizer. However, the measure
for risk-aversion (INSURE) is significantly negative indicating an increase in the
insurance ratio leads to decreased fertilizer expenditures per acre.
There are a few possible justifications for this unexpected result. First, some
farmers may view fertilizer as a risk-increasing input, meaning that risk averse farmers
would decrease their use of fertilizer. Whether fertilizer is risk-increasing or decreasing
is debated in the literature (Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 1993; Rajsic, Weersink, &
Gandorfer, 2009; Ramaswami, 1992). Second, insurance expenditures as a proportion of
total farm expenditures may be too simplistic a measure of farmer’s risk aversion,
particularly within this model, where there may be some endogeneity issues due to the
dependent variable FERT being a portion of total expenditures. Furthermore, an increase
in the effect of INSURE may be caused by a decrease in total expenditures (the
denominator of the ratio).
Contrarily, the marginal effect evaluated at the mean of SOLVE, an estimation of
the level of a farmer’s credit constraint, is 0.86. If a farmer is less solvent (and therefore
has a greater solvency ratio), he will increase risk-reducing inputs like fertilizer because
the farmer wants to insure a good yield and ensure he will not default on his debt
obligations.
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Table 6.2. Fertilizer and Other Agricultural Chemical Weighted OLS
Regression Results, 1991-2008
Models
Other Agricultural
Fertilizer (1)
Chemicals (2)
Coeff.
Std. Error
Coeff.
Std. Error
HBARLEY
13.43***
3.84
1.59
2.91
HCORN
28.70***
0.67
15.77***
0.39
HCOTTON
16.41***
3.66
35.84***
2.97
HOATS
6.97**
2.83
-13.72***
2.20
HSORGH
16.40***
1.76
11.79***
1.31
HSOY
8.36***
0.72
11.86***
0.37
HWHEAT
15.24***
1.01
7.94***
0.88
ACRESOP
0.0005***
0.00009
0.0004***
0.00007
WEALTH
0.000009
0.00007
0.0003***
0.00006
DP
0.19***
0.02
0.17***
0.01
GOV
0.11***
0.01
0.04***
0.01
AGE
-0.03***
0.01
-0.003
0.004
TENURE
2.53***
0.21
1.35***
0.15
WACF/WACACa
0.17***
0.02
0.12***
0.03
INSURE
-23.78***
2.50
-17.98***
1.85
SOLVE
1.58***
0.55
2.34***
0.41
DP*INSURE
-0.74***
0.27
-0.57***
0.20
DP*SOLVE
-0.09**
0.04
-0.20***
0.03
GOV*INSURE
-0.49***
0.14
0.18*
0.10
GOV*SOLVE
-0.03
0.04
0.12***
0.03
TIME
-0.23***
0.06
0.68***
0.04
TIMESQ
0.02***
0.003
-0.04***
0.003
Observations
24,118
24,118
Adjusted R Squared
0.399
0.342

Notes: *, **, *** indicate parameter signi
ﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
a- WACF used for Fertilizer model, WACAC used for Agricultural Chemical model. County
dummy variables are not reported due to the large number of counties (764) in the sample.
Additionally, the intercept is dropped to allow all counties to remain in model.

As hypothesized, an increase in decoupled direct payments and government
payments both increase fertilizer expenditures per acre by a small but statistically
significant amount. Coupled government payments based on production, inputs, or prices
are known to increase input use. However, decoupled direct payments are, in theory, not
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based on production, inputs, or prices unless they are linked by any of the coupling
mechanisms previously discussed. The results for modeling fertilizer as the dependent
variable suggest that decoupled direct payments may affect a farmer’s decision to use
fertilizers, although without panel data causality cannot be tested. The marginal effect of
government payments on fertilizer use per acre operated calculated at the mean is 0.08.
The marginal effect of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer use per acre operated
evaluated at the mean is 0.138, suggesting that the effect of DP on FERT is greater than
the effect of GOV on FERT.
Furthermore, the results for DP*INSURE and DP*SOLVE suggest that there are
three avenues by which decoupled direct payments may affect fertilizer expenditures per
acre: first, directly as seen through DP, second, indirectly through changes in risk
preferences (DP*INSURE), and third, indirectly through changes in financial risk
preferences (DP*SOLVE).
These results confirm the hypothesis: the effects of government payments and
decoupled direct payments on fertilizer use are both positive. Also, there is a greater
marginal effect of decoupled direct payments than other government payments.

This

indicates that decoupled payments might affect the intensive margin more than other
government programs and hence decoupled payments could ultimately lead to larger
production distortions or greater negative environmental impacts. GOV includes lump
sum payments that have no effect on production and production distorting price supports,
thus the effect of GOV serves as a lower bound on the effect of coupled payments on
fertilizer expenditures per acre.
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The effect of age on fertilizer expenditures per acre is negatively significant
(AGE): as a farmer’s age increases, fertilizer expenditures per acre decrease, although not
by a large magnitude. This supports the proposition that farmers with more experience 26
use less fertilizer, perhaps because they are familiar with other methods, or are reluctant
to apply more fertilizer. The two time trend variables (TIME and TIMESQ) together
suggest that over time, fertilizer expenditures have decreased at an increasing rate. This
may be due to technological advances in production practices such as genetically
modified crops that may require less fertilizer.
Model 2: Other Agricultural Chemicals (1991 – 2008)
A weighted ordinary least squares regression is also estimated for other
agricultural chemical expenditures per acre with similar results. The analysis uses 24,118
observations. Only two variables were insignificant at the 5 percent significance level:
harvested acres of barley per operated acres (HBARLEY) and age. The time trends
(TIME and TIMESQ) suggest that holding all else constant, as time progresses,
agricultural chemical expenditures per acre operated increase at a decreasing rate.
Contrary to Model 1, the agricultural chemical model does not have positive
coefficients associated with the ratio of program crops to total operated acres for all
crops. The effect of HOATS is negative and significantly related to agricultural chemical
expenditure per acre operated, suggesting that oats require fewer agricultural chemicals to
produce than the other program crops in the model. Like in the fertilizer model, the

26

Recall that AGE was used as a proxy for farm experience because of the high correlation (0.80) between
AGE and YEARSEXP.
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coefficients associated with the seven program crops in the agricultural chemical model
are not the same for all crops. For example, the coefficient for HCOTTON implies that a
1 percent increase of total acres operated used for harvesting cotton increases agricultural
chemical expenditures per acre by approximately $36.00, while a 1 percent increase of
total acres operated used for harvesting corn increases CHEM less than half that amount.
The coefficient for HBARLEY is not significant perhaps because of the low average
barley acres harvested. Similar to Model 1, total acres operated is statistically significant
but small.
The marginal effect of INSURE evaluated at the mean is -17.98, which may
imply that other agricultural chemicals may also be a risk-increasing input. The marginal
effect of SOLVE evaluated at the mean is 2.34, suggesting that as a farm become more
credit constrained, it increases expenditures of other agricultural chemicals per acre.
Coefficients for government payments per acres operated (GOV) and decoupled
direct payments per acres operated (DP) are both positive and small, but statistically
significant.

Furthermore, the coefficients on the interaction terms with DP are

statistically significant and negative, indicating that decoupled direct payments affect
agricultural chemical expenditures through changes in risk preference (DP*INSURE)
and/or credit constraints (DP*SOLVE) (Goodwin & Mishra 2006). Coefficients on the
interaction terms for government payments are negative, indicating that the marginal
effect of government payments on agricultural chemicals decreases with an increase in
solvency and/or insurance expenditures. The marginal effects of GOV and DP calculated
at the mean are 0.06 and 0.11, respectively, giving similar results to those found in the
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fertilizer model: the effects of government payments and decoupled direct payments on
agricultural chemical use are both positive. Also, the marginal effect of decoupled direct
payments is greater than the marginal effects of other government payments evaluated at
the means, indicating that decoupled payments may have greater effects on the intensive
margin than other government payments.
Regression Analysis Results: Structural Breaks
Structural breaks in 1996, 2002, and 2008 are expected due to policy changes in
those years. Chow tests are conducted to test structural breaks at the time the policy
changes occurred. Because no data is available after 2008, the hypothesis that a structural
break occurs in 2008 is not possible to test. A Chow test is used to find the hypothesized
structural breaks when the data is split into three subsets: 1991-1995, 1996-2001, and
2002-2008. The F-statistic for the fertilizer model with structural breaks in 1996 and
2002 is 18.05 (p=0). For the other agricultural chemicals model with structural breaks in
1996 and 2002, the F-test is 13.46 (p=0).
In order to test if there was any anticipation of policy changes or lags in farmer’s
decision to update due to policy changes, additional Chow tests are conducted for one
and two years before and after each policy change. Since there was an additional policy
change in 2008 creating ACRE, Chow tests are also conducted adding an additional break
in 2006. This iterative Chow test procedure requires 48 additional tests to be run for each
model, with the highest F-statistic determining the best fit structural breaks. 27 This

27

Iterative Chow tests are found in Appendix Tables D.1 and D.2.
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process finds that for fertilizer, structural breaks in 1996 and 2004 are a better fit than the
hypothesized breaks in 1996 and 2002. For other agricultural chemicals, the best fit
structural breaks occur in 1996 and 2000. This section begins with an explanation of the
hypothesized fertilizer and other agricultural chemical models and then compares the
results to the respective models with structural breaks determined by the iterative Chow
tests.
Fertilizers (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2002)
Table 6.3 reports the weighted OLS regression results for the model with fertilizer
expenditures per acre as the dependent variable with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002.
There are 4,755 observations in the first subset (1991-1995), 6,788 observations in the
second subset (1996-2001), and 12,575 observations in the third subset (2002-2008). The
adjusted R2 values are 0.50, 0.50, and 0.42, respectively, all of which are higher than the
adjusted R2 value of 0.40 for fertilizer Model 1 using all years. The first subset (19911995) does not have coefficients or standard errors for decoupled payments or the
interaction terms including that variable because before 1996, there were no decoupled
direct payments. Thus, all government payments are captured in the GOV variable. The
magnitude of the coefficient corresponding to government payments per acres operated in
this time period is almost triple the magnitude of the same variable in Model 1 using all
the sampled years.
Very few of the coefficients have changed sign or magnitude compared to Table
6.2, however the coefficient for HOATS is five times larger than in Model 1. Another
change from the first model is that the interaction term between government payments
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and solvency is statistically significant in the 1991 to 1995 subset.

Whether these

coefficients are statistically different from their corresponding coefficients in the whole
model using all sample years has not been tested, but it is important nonetheless to note
of these slight changes in the coefficients.
Table 6.3. Fertilizer Weighted OLS Regression Results with
1996 and 2002
Subsets
1991-1995
1996-2001
Std.
Std.
Coeff.
Error
Coeff.
Error
HBARLEY
17.52**
6.34
3.30
8.76
HCORN
27.69**
1.76
26.59***
1.35
HCOTTON
19.25*
8.56
15.99**
6.81
HOATS
25.86**
6.13
-14.62***
5.12
HSORGH
19.59**
3.60
14.56***
2.99
HSOY
11.33**
1.95
7.37***
1.52
HWHEAT
13.17**
2.28
16.68***
1.93
ACRESOP
0.001** 0.0003
0.0005*** 0.0002
WEALTH
-0.001** 0.0002
0.002*** 0.0002
DP
0.13***
0.03
GOV
0.29**
0.03
0.10***
0.02
AGE
-0.05**
0.01
-0.03***
0.01
TENURE
6.50**
0.52
2.03***
0.48
WACF
0.18**
0.07
0.11**
0.05
INSURE
-20.96** 5.44
-25.69***
4.78
SOLVE
4.31**
1.48
2.50*
1.45
DP*INSURE
0.14
0.46
DP*SOLVE
-0.23**
0.11
GOV*INSURE
-0.87**
0.34
-0.66***
0.22
GOV*SOLVE
-0.33**
0.09
0.19***
0.07
TIME
0.11
0.54
-3.13***
0.94
TIMESQ
0.04
0.09
0.15***
0.05
Observations
4,755
6,788
Adjusted R2
0.501
0.498

Structural Breaks in

2002-2008
Std.
Coeff.
Error
15.92
10.57
34.38***
1.07
10.92**
5.33
-8.93*
5.15
18.26***
4.06
3.23***
1.16
13.34***
1.71
0.0004*** 0.0001
0.0004*** 0.0001
0.34***
0.03
0.11***
0.02
-0.03***
0.01
0.42
0.27
0.03
0.03
-13.42***
4.42
0.61
0.71
-2.41***
0.43
-0.03
0.06
-0.59**
0.28
-0.03
0.09
1.14
1.01
-0.01
0.03

Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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12,575
0.420

The Chow tests suggest that there are significant differences within these three
subsets of the data (years 1991 through 2008) so comparing coefficients across these
three subsets indicates which characteristics are unique to each subset. For example, the
coefficient for HSOY decreases with each subset, going from about 11 in the first subset,
then 7 in the second subset, and finally 3 in the third subset. This implies that within
each subset, an increase in the amount of harvested acres of soybeans increases fertilizer
expenditures per acre by less and less. Possible causes of this decrease may be changes
in soybean production practices or the type of soybeans used due to biotechnology. The
effect of HBARLEY is only significant in the first subset. Also, the effect of HOATS is
positive and significant (as expected) in the first subset.

In the other subsets the

coefficient on HOATS are negative and significant, perhaps explaining the much smaller
HOATS coefficient of 6.97 seen in Table 6.2: for five years, an increase in harvested
acres of oats increased fertilizer expenditures; for the remaining twelve years, the
relationship was negative, therefore pulling the coefficient towards zero.
Another interesting relationship emerges when comparing the first subset with the
second: with the introduction of decoupled direct payments in 1996, the marginal effect
of government payments on fertilizer expenditures per acre evaluated at the mean
decreases from 0.20 to 0.08. Between 2002 and 2008, the marginal effect of GOV
evaluated at the mean remains almost the same (0.07), but the marginal effect of DP
evaluated at the mean increases from 0.12 between 1996 and 2001 to 0.21 from 2002 to
2008. This may imply that after 2002, an increase in decoupled direct payments has a
larger impact on fertilizer expenditure per acre operated than prior to the enactment of the
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FSRI Act, possibly because of the introduction of updating. When the model is broken
into three subsets, the results support the hypotheses: other government payments and
decoupled direct payments are significant and positively related to fertilizer expenditures
per acre.

Future expectations of updating may be an underlying reason that the

magnitude of the effects of decoupled direct payments increased after 2002. It is also
interesting to note that the marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer use
is two to three times greater than the marginal effect of other government payments.
Lastly, the effects of the time trend variables TIME and TIMESQ are only
significant in the second subset, where the signs imply that between 1996 and 2001,
technology and other longitudinal factors decrease fertilizer expenditures at a decreasing
rate.
Fertilizers (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2004)
Table 6.4 looks very similar to Table 6.3. In fact, because the hypothesized break
in 1996 holds, the first subset is identical to the first subset in Table 6.3. The first subset
has 4,755 observations, the second subset (1996-2003) has 9,747 observations, and the
third subset has 9,616 observations. The adjusted R2 value for each subset is 0.50, 0.41,
and 0.45, respectively.
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Table 6.4. Fertilizer OLS Regression Results with Structural Breaks in 1996 and
2004

HCORN
HCOTTON
HSORGH
HSOY
HBARLEY
HOATS
HWHEAT
ACRESOP
WEALTH
DP
GOV
AGE
TENURE
WACF
INSURE
SOLVE
DP*INSURE
DP*SOLVE
GOV*INSURE
GOV*SOLVE
TIME
TIMESQ
Observations
Adjusted R2

1991-1995
Std.
Coeff.
Error
27.69***
1.76
19.25**
8.56
19.59***
3.60
11.33***
1.95
17.52***
6.34
25.86***
6.13
13.17***
2.28
0.001*** 0.0003
-0.001*** 0.0002
0.29***
0.03
-0.05***
0.01
6.50***
0.52
0.18***
0.07
-20.96***
5.44
4.31***
1.48
-0.87***
0.34
-0.33***
0.09
0.11
0.54
0.04
0.09
4,755
0.501

Subsets
1996-2003
Std.
Coeff.
Error
26.69***
1.05
11.78**
5.10
13.73***
2.50
6.36***
1.16
11.52*
7.16
-12.55*** 4.31
16.12***
1.62
0.0005*** 0.001
0.001*** 0.002
0.12***
0.03
0.09***
0.02
-0.03***
0.01
2.53***
0.39
0.05
0.04
-26.60*** 3.87
0.97
0.70
0.45
0.40
-0.11**
0.05
-0.62***
0.18
0.12**
0.05
-4.00***
0.50
0.20***
0.03
9,747
0.408

2004-2008
Std.
Coeff.
Error
39.49***
1.33
26.13***
8.74
24.00***
6.57
1.06
1.50
-11.42
17.06
-9.75
6.20
15.82***
2.02
0.0003** 0.0001
0.0005*** 0.0001
0.39***
0.04
0.09***
0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.12
0.30
-0.05
0.04
-11.96**
5.53
9.63***
2.50
-2.68***
0.50
-0.45**
0.18
-0.60
0.46
0.01
0.15
3.33
2.87
-0.07
0.09
9,616
0.450

Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Finding a structural break in 2004 rather than in 2002 when a new policy was
enacted indicates that farmers are hesitant to adjust their on-farm production decisions
until after they see how the policy will affect their own expected utility function. If a
farmer expects government policies to change regularly, it may be optimal to wait and
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see how the new policy may negatively or positively impact him or her.

Because

fertilizer is such an integral part of the production of program crops, farmers might be
more likely to hold off on changing input decisions regarding fertilizer and other
agricultural chemicals. However, these conjectures are unnecessary: an additional Chow
test was performed to see if this restricted model with breaks in 1996 and 2004 is
significantly different than the expected model with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002.
The results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between this model
and the model described in Table 6.3 (F-test=0.858, p=1). Therefore, the hypothesized
breaks for fertilizer hold.
The marginal effects of government payments and decoupled direct payments
evaluated at the means in each of the subsets are also similar to the model with expected
breaks in 1996 and 2002 (results in Table 6.3). Between 1991 and 1995, the marginal
effect of government payments on fertilizer expenditures is 0.20, between 1996 and 2003
the marginal effect is 0.07, and between 2004 and 2008 the marginal effect is 0.06. The
marginal effect of decoupled direct payments evaluated at the mean on fertilizer
expenditures between 1996 and 2003 is 0.14 and increases to 0.21 between 2004 and
2008.
Other Agricultural Chemicals (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2002)
Table 6.5 shows the results for the model with other agricultural chemical
expenditures per acre operated as the dependent variable with structural breaks in 1996
and 2002. The first subset includes years 1991 through 1995, the second subset 1996
through 2001, and the third subset 2002 through 2008.
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Table 6.5. Other Agricultural Chemicals Weighted OLS Regression Results with
Structural Breaks in 1996 and 2002
1991-1995
Std.
Coeff.
Error
HBARLEY
0.49
5.18
HCORN
15.89***
0.98
HCOTTON
35.94***
8.00
HOATS
-11.59**
5.41
HSORGH
3.31
2.88
HSOY
11.01***
1.00
HWHEAT
8.01***
2.44
ACRESOP
0.0006*** 0.0002
WEALTH
0.0004*** 0.0001
DP
GOV
0.15***
0.02
AGE
-0.03***
0.01
TENURE
2.53***
0.41
WACAC
0.12
0.09
INSURE
-23.17***
4.37
SOLVE
3.75***
1.19
DP*INSURE
DP*SOLVE
GOV*INSURE
-0.41
0.27
GOV*SOLVE
-0.0005
0.07
TIME
2.56***
0.48
TIMESQ
-0.32***
0.08
Observations
4,755
2
0.430
Adjusted R

Subsets
1996-2001
Std.
Coeff.
Error
3.10
7.04
16.77***
0.82
21.00***
6.13
-13.72***
4.43
18.24***
2.39
14.77***
0.75
10.80***
1.97
0.0004*** 0.0001
0.0005*** 0.0001
0.26***
0.03
-0.02
0.02
-0.01
0.01
2.13***
0.38
0.08
0.07
-15.53***
3.81
4.14***
1.16
-1.65***
0.37
-0.26***
0.09
0.86***
0.18
0.06
0.05
2.35***
0.69
-0.16***
0.04
6,788
0.426

2002-2008
Std.
Coeff.
Error
5.75
7.08
13.55***
0.61
22.92***
4.42
-0.42
3.58
12.73***
2.70
9.24***
0.55
7.66***
1.31
0.0002*** 0.00008
0.0002*** 0.00007
0.18***
0.02
0.03**
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.22
0.18
0.25***
0.06
-7.57***
2.95
0.23
0.47
-0.91***
0.28
-0.001
0.04
0.16
0.19
-0.02
0.06
-0.94
0.68
0.01
0.02

Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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12,575
0.322

There are 4,755 observations in the first subset (1991-1995), 6,788 observations in the
second subset (1996-2001), and 12,575 observations in the third subset (2002-2008). The
adjusted R2 values are 0.43, 0.43, and 0.32, respectively.
Each of the seven program crops in the model have similar coefficients to the
agricultural chemical model presented in Table 6.2, with the exception of HSORGH,
which is smaller in magnitude in the first subset, but not statistically significant. Also,
the WACAC coefficient is only statistically different from zero in the third subset. This
is somewhat surprising as it may suggest that the price of other agricultural chemicals
does not affect the other agricultural chemical expenditures per operated acres. Contrary
to the fertilizer model with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002, the effects of the time
trend variables are both significant in the first two subsets, suggesting that between 1991
and 2001, agricultural chemical expenditures have increased at a decreasing rate.
Comparing the three subsets of the agricultural chemical model, the absence of
decoupled direct payments is evident before 1996. After their introduction at that time,
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between DP and agricultural
chemical expenditures per acre. In the second subset, both interaction terms with DP are
negative.

The marginal effect of decoupled payments per acre operated on other

agricultural chemical expenditures between 1996 and 2001 is 0.14 evaluated at the mean;
between 2002 and 2008, the marginal effect evaluated at the mean is 0.13.
The effect of other government payments is negative in the second subset (19962001) but not significant. Otherwise, the effects of government payments per operated
acre are similar to the results for the whole time period (Model 2). However, the
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interaction terms show a weaker relationship in all three subset models relative to the
results using all the data. GOV*INSURE is only significant between 1996 and 2001 and
GOV*SOLVE is not significant in any of the three subsets. The marginal effect of
government payments per acre operated on other agricultural chemical expenditures per
acre evaluated at the mean is 0.13 between 1991 and 1995, 0.04 between 1996 and 2001,
and 0.04 between 2002 and 2008.
Agricultural Chemicals: Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2000
A Chow test conducted to determine if the model with breaks in 1996 and 2000 is
significantly different than the hypothesized model with structural breaks in 1996 and
2002 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the hypothesized
model with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002 and a model with structural breaks in 1996
and 2000 (F-statistics=1.983, p=0), shown in Table 6.6. The break occurring in 2000
instead of 2002 could be due to farmers’ anticipation of new policies. This would be the
opposite of what was explained in the previous fertilizer model. However, the most
likely cause of this structural break is not policy related.

In 2000, the patent for

Monsanto’s chemical herbicide Roundup expired, reducing the price of glyphosphate
(generic Roundup) dramatically and increasing the volume used in the United States
(Baccara et al., 2003). Farmers use this herbicide due to the “broad-spectrum weed
control, low cost and simplicity” (Shaner, 2000) and have decreased the use of other
herbicides in place of using glyphosphate. Additionally, round-up ready crops, which are
resistant to this herbicide, have also led to increased use of glyphosphate. It is possible
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that the effect of increasing use of this chemical after 2000 on other agricultural chemical
expenditures dominated any structural break due to policy changes in 2002.
The number of observations in the first subset (1991-1995) is 4,755, the number
of observations in the second subset (1996-1999) is 5,060, and the number of
observations in the third subset (2000-2008) is 14,303. Respective adjusted R2 values are
0.430, 0.46, and 0.34.

The first subset (1991-1995) is identical to the first subset

presented in Table 6.5. The second and third subsets have minimal changes from the
previous model with structural breaks at 1996 and 2002, however a few key variables
have coefficients that are now statistically significant.
The effect of the ratio of owned-to-operated acres is positive and significant in
every subset, indicating that, as a farmer owns more of the total land operated, he or she
increases expenditures on agricultural chemicals. Also, the coefficients of the time trend
variables are significant in all three subsets; thus between 1991 and 2008, agricultural
chemical expenditures have increased at a decreasing rate.
The coefficients on decoupled direct payments and other government payments
are both positive in all three subsets, but the coefficient on government payments is only
significant in the first subset (1991-1995). The effect of the interaction term between DP
and insurance expenditures is negative and significant from 1996 through 2008, implying
that the marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on agricultural chemical
expenditures decreases as insurance expenditures increase.

The coefficient on

DP*SOLVE is negative but smaller; however, for the third subset (2000-2008), the effect
is not statistically different than zero. The marginal effect of decoupled direct payments
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on agricultural chemical expenditures evaluated at the mean between 1996 and 1999 is
0.22 and 0.09 after 2000.

The marginal effect of other government payments on

agricultural chemical expenditures evaluated at the mean is 0.13 before decoupled direct
payments are introduced, 0.07 between 1996 and 1999, and 0.03 after 2000.
Table 6.6. Other Agricultural Chemicals OLS Regression Results with Structural
Breaks in 1996 and 2000
1991-1995
Std.
Coeff.
Error
HCORN
15.89***
0.98
HCOTTON
35.94***
8.00
HSORGH
3.31
2.88
HSOY
11.01***
1.00
HBARLEY
0.49
5.18
HOATS
-11.59**
5.41
HWHEAT
8.01***
2.44
ACRESOP
0.0006*** 0.0002
WEALTH
0.0004*** 0.0001
DP
GOV
0.15***
0.02
AGE
-0.03***
0.01
TENURE
2.53***
0.41
WACAC
0.12
0.09
INSURE
-23.17***
4.37
SOLVE
3.75***
1.19
DP*INSURE
DP*SOLVE
GOV*INSURE
-0.41
0.27
GOV*SOLVE
0.00
0.07
TIME
2.56***
0.48
TIMESQ
-0.32***
0.08
Observations
4,755
Adjusted R2
0.430

Subsets
1996-1999
Std.
Coeff.
Error
12.83***
1.03
17.17**
7.90
11.44***
2.87
14.55***
0.94
-0.45
8.23
0.42
5.27
8.68***
2.45
0.0002
0.0002
0.0001*** 0.0002
0.37***
0.03
0.03
0.03
-0.02**
0.01
1.13**
0.47
0.23***
0.09
-14.95***
4.40
7.19***
1.56
-1.67***
0.45
-0.57***
0.12
0.41
0.31
0.12
0.10
11.81***
2.04
-0.83***
0.14
5,060
0.458

2000-2008
Std.
Coeff.
Error
14.95***
0.54
26.35***
3.97
15.04***
2.66
10.45***
0.49
1.23
6.34
-9.79***
3.29
10.00***
1.21
0.0003*** 0.00008
0.0003*** 0.00007
0.14***
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.54***
0.18
0.20***
0.05
-11.70***
2.75
0.39
0.46
-0.80***
0.25
-0.04
0.03
0.29**
0.12
0.05
0.03
2.13***
0.33
-0.09***
0.01

Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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14,303
0.339

Summary
In this chapter, descriptive statistics are presented to illustrate farm and farmer
characteristics that might impact the farmer’s decision-making process.

Regression

results for both fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre operated
(FERT and CHEM) are analyzed 1) for the whole sample period (1991-2008), 2) with
structural breaks in 1996 and 2002, and 3) with structural breaks in years found through
an iterative Chow test.
All model results indicate that increases in decoupled direct payments have
positive affects on fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre with
the direct effect captured by the coefficient on DP. This may be due to insurance or
wealth effects created by an additional income stream (Hennessy, 1998), or possibly
through farmer’s expectations of updating (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010), or a reduction in
credit constraints (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006). The marginal effects of government
payments and decoupled direct payments on both dependent variables (FERT and
CHEM) are positive, as seen in Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2.
The marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer and other
agricultural chemicals evaluated at the mean are two to three times greater than the
marginal effects of government payments evaluated at the mean.

As noted in the

discussion for Model 1, since lump sum payments could not be separated from coupled
payments, the marginal effects of other government payments on fertilizer and other
agricultural chemical expenditures serves as a lower bound on the effects of fully coupled
payments (in the form of price floors or per unit subsidies).
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These results are in line with the tested hypothesis: There is a positive and
significant effect of decoupled direct payments (DP) and all other forms of government
payments (GOV) on both fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre.
Since both dependent variables (FERT and CHEM) and the independent variables (GOV
and DP) are normalized with respect to total acres operated, these effects are not due to
farm size. Furthermore, because FERT and CHEM are adjusted using a sector specific
PPI and DP and GOV are adjusted using CPI, these effects are not caused by inflation.
Between 1991 and 2008, the average government payment per acre operated
(GOV) is almost twice the average decoupled direct payment per acre operated (DP).
However, the average DP estimate within that period is low because it includes 5 years of
zero decoupled payments (1991-1995). Between 1991 and 1995, the average government
payment per acre was $11.87. Between 1996 and 2001, average GOV fell slightly to
$10.90 and average DP was $7.49. Interestingly, after updating was allowed in the 2002
Farm Bill, average decoupled direct payments stayed almost the same ($7.40) while other
government payments (lump sum and coupled payments) declined to $6.61. Because DP
have a greater marginal effect on agricultural chemicals than GOV, this movement
towards decoupled payments may result in a greater distortion in production through
changes to the intensive margin.
As stated in the hypothesis, the magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct
payments depends on the payout rates for decoupled direct payments and coupled
payments, the discount rate δ , and the subjective probability of updating γ . The results
indicate that the payout rate for decoupled payments is greater than the payout rate for
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other government payments after 2002 and the marginal effect of DP on agricultural
expenditures does increase after 2002.

The regression analysis does not provide a

measure of the discount rate or the subjective probability of updating. However, these
are factors of the magnitude of the effect of decoupled payments on agricultural
chemicals. If the discount rate δ is low, farmers will allocate more resources to realizing
future benefits associated with updating. In other words, a patient farmer will forego
benefits today to gain future benefits.

If the subjective probability of updating is

collectively large (close to 1) for all farms, the impact of policy updates will play an
important role in the magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments. The final
chapter describes the policy implications of these results.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Decoupled direct payments were introduced to U.S. agricultural policy in 1996
with production flexibility contract payments paid to farm operators based on historic
acreage and yields, not production, prices, or inputs. This change was motivated by the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture requiring World Trade Organization
member countries to reduce trade distorting agricultural policies. Decoupled payments
were continued in the two subsequent farm bills.

The Farm Security and Rural

Investment Act of 2002 gave farmers the option of updating base acreage and yields,
essentially changes the calculations upon which decoupled payments are based. The
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 gave farmers the option of foregoing a
portion of their decoupled direct payments to obtain Average Crop Revenue Election
(ACRE) program payments based on national market price and state Olympic moving
average yields.
The literature reviewed has identified several mechanisms by which decoupled
payments have the potential to distort production in the current period. First, risk averse
producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects associated with
the decoupled payments. Second, in imperfect credit markets decoupled payments may
ease constraints by increasing total wealth. Third, current production decisions may be
influenced by expectations of future decoupled payments, especially if updating is
anticipated. Fourth, input markets are affected through possible changes in the allocation
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of labor and land, due to the capitalization of decoupled payments in land values. Lastly,
exit deterrence may result in fewer farms leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed
costs, declining average costs, or cross-subsidization. If decoupled direct payments are
coupled to production decisions, farmers may increase their use of production inputs
including environmentally harmful agricultural chemicals.
This thesis tested the hypothesis that there exists a positive and significant
relationship between both decoupled direct payments and coupled government payments
and the use of fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals per acre. Since quantity data
was not available and prices are controlled for, expenditures per acre serve as a proxy for
the quantity of agricultural chemicals used. The relationship between both coupled
government payments and decoupled direct payments and agricultural chemical use was
expected to be positive and the theoretical model illustrated that the magnitude of the
effect of decoupled direct payments relative to the effect of coupled government
payments depended on the sizes of coupled price supports and decoupled farm subsidies,
the subjective probability of updating, and the discount rate. Additionally, structural
breaks were expected around the time of policy changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008 due to
expectations of updating.
Using USDA Farm Cost and Return Survey and Agricultural Resources and
Management Survey data from 1991 to 2008, weighted ordinary least squares regression
analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis. The model allowed decoupled and other
government payments to affect fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per
acre in three ways: directly, captured by the coefficients of decoupled payments and other
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government payments, and indirectly through two interaction terms with a farmer’s level
of risk aversion and financial risk. The direct effects are positive for both types of
government payments, as expected. The indirect effects captured by the interaction terms
were negative, suggesting that the effects of government payments decrease at higher
levels of risk aversion and financial risk.
Thus, government payments can ease credit constraints under imperfect credit
markets by increasing a farmer’s total wealth (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006). Moreover,
decoupled direct payments and other government payments can affect a farmers risk
preferences by increasing total assets. Similarly, decoupled direct payments and other
government payments can reduce levels of risk aversion by guaranteeing a level of
revenue that is not tied to production (Hennessy, 1998).
The marginal effects evaluated at the mean of both types of government payments
were positive. Furthermore, the magnitude of the marginal effects of decoupled direct
payments on fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals expenditures per acre evaluated at
the means was two to three times greater than the marginal effects of other government
payments.
Because data is not available after 2008, the regression analysis was not used to
test for changes in production decisions due to policy changes in the 2008 Farm Bill.
However, the theoretical model illustrates that the ACRE program may be implicitly
coupled to production because base yield is determined by an Olympic moving average
that changes every year. Therefore, farmers have the opportunity to change base yield
each year and will do so in order to maximize their expected utility of wealth.
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Implications
The results may have significant implications for future agricultural policies.
The marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer and other agricultural
chemicals expenditures per acre evaluated at the mean was two to three times greater than
the marginal effect of other government payments evaluated at the mean, suggesting that
decoupled payments affect the intensive margin more than other government payments.
Thus, decoupled payments can be more production distorting and possibly more
environmental harmful than other government payments.

Since in the model other

government payments included non-distortive lump sum payments and fully coupled
price supports, the effect of government payments on fertilizer and other agricultural
chemical expenditures per acre serves as a lower bound on the effect of coupled price
supports. However, it is likely that coupled payments make up the majority of other
government payments.
Hence, the results of the empirical model suggest that the move towards
decoupled payments may lead to greater production distortions through their affect on the
intensive margin. The results also support previous research that a farmer’s expectation
of future updating acts as a coupling mechanism linking decoupled payments to
production (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010; Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008).
Although changes to production decisions from the newest decoupled direct
payment program, ACRE, could not be tested empirically, an important implication is
that the ACRE program introduced in 2008 set historic yield to an Olympic moving
average, meaning that each year the historic period changes. This policy may create a
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link between current acreage and input decisions and future program crop payments and
therefore be in violation of standing World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.
The theoretical and empirical results have major implications for the future of
U.S. agricultural policies as well as international policies within the WTO. The 1994
Agreement on Agriculture required member countries to reduce production distorting
policies, leading the US to introduce decoupled payments. However, if these types of
payments have a larger affect on agricultural chemical use than coupled payments, the
introduction of decoupled payments may have increased production distortions via their
impact on the intensive margin rather than decreasing production distortions as intended.
Thus, even WTO sanctioned ‘green box’ policies may distort production. Furthermore,
the movement towards decoupled payments in the US and away from coupled payments
may increase agricultural chemical use, with negative impacts on the rural environment.
If the US wants to support farmers’ income without distorting production, policies
must be implemented on a one-time basis and not updated every four to seven years. The
original intention of the 1996 FAIR Act was to introduce a temporary decoupled payment
program (production flexibility contracts) that would be eliminated after seven years. In
2002, production flexibility contracts were eliminated only to be replaced by two other
decoupled payments (fixed direct payments and countercyclical payments) Hence, Milton
Friedman may have been correct to say, “Nothing is so permanent as a temporary
government program” and farmers recognize that once implemented, policies tend to
stick around.

101

Limitations and Further Research
To more fully understand the link between decoupled payments, updating and
agricultural chemical use more research is needed to overcome the limitations of this
research. First, the lack of panel data means that year-to-year changes in a specific
farmer’s production decisions could not be tracked. The use of panel data would grant a
better understanding of how both the extensive and intensive production margins are
impacted by policy changes.
Furthermore, Phase III data only includes aggregate total expenditures of fertilizer
and other agricultural chemicals, not actual quantities per acre. Quantities of fertilizer
and agricultural chemicals per acre should be used in the analysis rather farm-level total
expenditures to gain a better understanding of how different types of government
payments affect the intensive margin. Phase II data contains input quantities data on a
crop specific field-level basis, but Phase II data does not contain information about
decoupled payments because these payments are received at the farm-level, not the fieldlevel. A limited analysis could be conducted using the small number of farms that are
questioned during both Phase II and Phase III. Quantity data could also be used to
determine how decoupled direct payments affect environmental quality by examining the
use of particularly environmentally hazardous agricultural chemicals.
Additionally, because the data available did not separate other government
payments into lump sum payments and coupled price supports, it was not possible to
examine the exact magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments relative to
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coupled payments. Future research should aim to further separate other government
payments into lump sum transfers and coupled payments.
This thesis focused on the effect of government payments on the use of
agricultural chemicals. However, similar models could analyze other non-farm inputs to
determine if the affect of government payments on the intensive margins of these inputs
is similar. Lastly, the theoretical model illustrating that ACRE program payments
implicitly create a link between current acreage and input decisions and future program
crop payments should be tested empirically by analyzing data after the 2008 Farm Bill.
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Appendix A
Comparison of Partially and Fully Decoupled Payments
Table A.1. Comparison of PFC, DP, CCP & ACRE Programs in U.S. Farm Bills

Years
Type of Policy
Total
Expenditure
Program Crops

Production
Flexibility
Fixed Direct
Contracts
Payments
1996 – 2002
2002 – 2012
Fully decoupled
$5 – 6 billion annually

Counter-Cyclical
Acreage Crop
Payments
Revenue Election
2002 – 2012
2008 - 2012
Partially decoupled, linked to price not production
~ $4 billion annually
unknown

Wheat, corn,
barley, grain
sorghum,
oats, upland
cotton, and
rice.

Wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats,
upland cotton, rice, soybeans, other
oilseeds, and peanuts.

Wheat, corn, barley,
grain sorghum, oats,
upland cotton, rice,
soybeans, other
oilseeds, peanuts, dry
peas, lentils, small
chickpeas, and large
chickpeas

One time
enrollment
for 7 year
contract

Annual
agreement,
allows for
advance
payments up to
50% before
harvest
Set for each
commodity in
FSRI Act

Annual agreement, must
decide how to define
base acres and payment
yield

Alternative to receiving
CCPs; must remain
enrolled until 2012;
program reduces all
fixed direct payments
to the farm by 20%

1. Use current program
yields, OR update to:
2. Program Yields +
{70% of (Farm’s
average yield from 1998
to 2001) – (Current
program Yields)}
3. 93.5 % of 1998-2001
average yields.

Benchmark State yield
is a commodity and
state specific measure
of the moving Olympic
average yield per
planted acre.

1. Payment acreage that
CY 2002 –
would have been used
2008: 85% of
for 2002 PFC payments
base acres in
+ average oilseed
selected
plantings in 1998-2001
commodity
OR
CY 2009 –
2. 4-year average of total
2011: 83.3%
acres planted + those
of base acres
unable to be planted due
planted or
to weather conditions in
considered
1998-2001
planted in
selected
commodity
Sources: (ERS, 2002; ERS, 2008; Young & Shields, 1996)

CY 2009-2011: 83.3%
of base acres planted or
considered planted in
selected commodity
CY 2012: 85% of base
acres in selected
commodity

Eligibility

Calculation of
Payment Yield

Calculation of
Payment Acres

Set for each
commodity in
FAIR Act

85% of base
acres in
selected
commodity
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Appendix B
Descriptive Statistics

South
Dakota

Ohio

Nebraska

Missouri

Minnesota

Kentucky

Iowa

Indiana

Illinois

Table B.1. Average Harvested Acreage of Program Crops in Extended
Heartland Region, 1991-2008

278.5 243.6 228.3 103.6 184.5 134.5 299.8 160.3 234.8
Corn
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
14.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
Cotton
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
8.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
Rice
1.8
0.5
0.0
1.9
0.0
13.8 24.8
0.1
5.2
Sorghum
245.3 224.2 198.5 111.7 201.2 239.2 140.5 212.0 245.5
Soybean
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
10.1
0.3
0.1
0.2
5.5
Barley
1.0
0.2
2.8
0.1
3.4
0.8
1.7
0.8
7.8
Oats
18.0 16.8
0.6
15.3 72.4 38.7 66.7 43.5 179.8
Wheat
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
4.2
0.0
1.9
0.0
24.9
Oilseed
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.0
0.1
5.4
0.0
1.8
Pulse Crop 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Peanuts
$12.00

$8.31
$7.47

$8.00

90%

$8.31
$7.58 $7.49

$7.37
$5.78

$6.00

92%

$9.55

$9.18

88%
$5.50 $5.46

86%
84%

$4.62

Percent

$10.00
Payment per Acre

94%

$10.93

82%

$4.00

80%
$2.00
78%
76%

$-

Average decoupled payment per acre

Percent receiving decoupled payment

Figure B.1. Average Decoupled Payments per Acre in Extended Heartland Region,
1996-2008
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25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%

Value of Production

Figure B.2. Value of Production in Extended Heartland Region, 1991-2008
60%
48%

50%

Percent (%)

40%
28%

30%

20%

10%

16%
7%
1%

0%
< High School

High School

Some College

Finished College Master's Degree <

Level of Education

Figure B.3. Primary Operator’s Level of Education in Extended Heartland Region,
1991-2008
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Appendix C
Marginal Effects of Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency
Table C.1. Marginal Effects of Decoupled Direct Payments, Other Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency on
Fertilizer Expenditures Evaluated at the Mean
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Marginal Effects Evaluated at the Mean
GOV
DP
INSURE
SOLVE

Mean
INSURE

GOV

DP

Whole Model
1991-2008

0.08

0.14

-32.25

0.86

9.81

4.88

0.06

0.10

Expected Breaks
1991-1995
1996-2001
2002-2008

0.20
0.08
0.07

0.12
0.21

-31.31
-31.82
-35.13

0.37
2.85
0.22

11.87
10.90
6.61

7.49
7.40

0.05
0.06
0.06

0.12
0.10
0.08

Actual Breaks
1991-1995
1996-2003
2004-2008

0.20
0.07
0.06

0.14
0.21

-31.31
-29.33
-36.97

0.37
1.40
6.24

11.87
9.66
7.21

7.27
7.72

0.05
0.06
0.06

0.12
0.11
0.06

SOLVE

Notes: Marginal effects of decoupled direct payments per acre (DP) and all other government payments per acre (GOV) on fertilizer expenditures per
acre operated are evaluated at the mean of the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures (INSURE) and ratio of total farm financial debt to total farm
financial assets (SOLVE). Marginal effects of INSURE and SOLVE are evaluated at the mean of DP and GOV. GOV, DP, INSURE, and SOLVE are
adjusted using CPI; fertilizer expenditures are adjusted using PPI.

Table C.2. Marginal Effects of Decoupled Direct Payments, Other Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency on
Other Agricultural Chemical Expenditures Evaluated at the Mean
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Marginal Effects Evaluated at the Mean
GOV
DP
INSURE
SOLVE

Mean
INSURE

GOV

DP

Whole Model
1991-2008

0.06

0.11

-17.98

2.34

9.81

4.88

0.06

0.10

Expected Breaks
1991-1995
1996-2001
2002-2008

0.13
0.04
0.04

0.14
0.13

-23.17
-15.53
-7.57

3.75
4.14
0.23

11.87
10.90
6.61

7.49
7.40

0.05
0.06
0.06

0.12
0.10
0.08

Actual Breaks
1991-1995
1996-1999
2000-2008

0.13
0.07
0.03

0.22
0.09

-23.17
-14.95
-11.70

3.75
7.19
0.39

11.87
6.62
9.82

7.34
7.50

0.05
0.06
0.06

0.12
0.10
0.08

SOLVE

Notes: Marginal effects of decoupled direct payments per acre (DP) and all other government payments per acre (GOV) on other agricultural chemical
expenditures per acre are evaluated at the mean of the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures (INSURE) and ratio of total farm financial debt to
total farm financial assets (SOLVE). Marginal effects of INSURE and SOLVE are evaluated at the mean of DP and GOV. GOV, DP, INSURE, and
SOLVE are adjusted using CPI; agricultural chemical expenditures are adjusted using PPI.

Appendix D
Estimation of Structural Breaks
Table D.1. Iterative Chow Test Statistics Estimating Structural Breaks
Policy Changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008: Fertilizer Model
2 Breaks
3 Breaks (include 2006)
2000 2001 2002 2003
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
14.00 13.26 13.21 13.43
1994 16.16 15.30 15.72 16.81 17.63
13.28 12.61 12.67 13.11
1995 15.07 14.34 14.91 16.31 17.30
14.19 14.33 14.72 15.03
1996 16.44 16.94 18.05 19.26 20.40
13.13 13.22 13.55 13.94
1997 14.71 15.11 16.09 17.35 18.34
12.97 12.92 13.39 13.76
1998 14.53 14.68 15.86 17.10 17.96

Around

2004
13.68
13.46
15.52
14.33
14.08

Note: Largest F-statistic (20.40) found in test for structural breaks in 1996 and 2004. However, an
additional F-test comparing model with breaks in 1996 and 2004 to hypothesized model with breaks in
1996 and 2002 found no significant difference (F-stat=0.858, p=1).

Table D.2. Iterative Chow Test Statistics Estimating Structural Breaks Around
Policy Changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008: Other Agricultural Chemicals Model
2 Breaks
3 Breaks (Include 2006)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
10.92 9.77 9.56 8.66 8.51
1994 13.60 11.69 12.50 10.84 11.34
11.08 9.88 9.61 8.78 8.55
1995 13.85 11.90 12.59 11.05 11.41
11.85 10.43 10.19 9.55 9.35
1996 15.03 12.72 13.46 12.21 12.63
11.42 10.56 10.63 10.57 10.47
1997 14.17 12.76 13.92 13.58 14.08
9.85 9.26 9.32 9.43 9.20
1998 11.92 10.84 11.99 11.89 12.21
Note: Largest F-statistic (15.03) found in test for structural breaks in 1996 and 2000. An additional
Chow test comparing model with breaks in 1996 and 2000 to hypothesized model with breaks in 1996
and 2002 found a statistically significant difference (F-stat=1.983, p=0).
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